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Peter W. Salsich, Jr.*

INTRODUCTION
“I didn’t want to leave, but I didn’t have a choice,” Annie Ricks, the
last of fifteen thousand former residents of the Cabrini-Green public housing complex in Chicago, stated upon leaving the eleventh-floor apartment
where she lived with five of her eight children. 1 Ms. Ricks and her children
were forced to leave in December 2010 because the building in which her
apartment was located had become so dilapidated that Chicago Housing
Authority (“CHA”) officials had declared it uninhabitable. 2 Her new apartment, in a low-rise building on Chicago’s South Side, was completely renovated but smaller, with three bedrooms instead of the five in the apartment
she had to vacate. 3 Demolition of the Cabrini-Green complex was part of
the CHA’s ambitious Plan for Transformation, announced in October 1999
and begun in 2000 as a ten-year, but later extended to a fifteen-year, plan to
demolish obsolete high-rise public housing units and replace them with
twenty-five thousand new or rehabilitated public housing units. 4
Similar efforts at transformation of isolated, high-rise public housing
ghettos have been taking place across the country. This reform movement
began during the Reagan administration and was aided by Clinton-era legislation authorizing a series of experiments to provide greater flexibility to
local public housing authorities (“PHAs”). 5 The programs include Home-

* McDonnell Professor of Justice in American Society, Saint Louis University School of Law;
J.D. 1965, Saint Louis University School of Law; A.B. 1959, Notre Dame University. I appreciate the
comments and suggestions given to me by Matt Bodie, Chad Flanders, Roger Goldman, Joel Goldstein,
Justin Hansford, Yvette Liebsman, Carol Needham, Anders Walker, Sydney Watson, Michael Wolff
and other participants in a workshop at the School of Law. Research Librarians Lynn Hartke, David
Kullman, and Peggy McDermott were indispensable. Linda Lawhorn and Ainsley Bochniak provided
excellent research assistance. © Peter W. Salsich, Jr.
1 Sylvester Monroe, Closing Cabrini-Green, T HE ROOT (Dec. 16, 2010, 12:08 PM),
http://www.theroot.com/print/48881 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Lawrence J. Vale & Erin Graves, The Chicago Housing Authority’s Plan for Transformation:
What Does the Research Show So Far? 8-9 (Mass. Inst. of Tech., Dep’t of Urban Studies & Planning,
2010), available at http://www.macfound.org/atf/cf/%7Bb0386ce3-8b29-4162-8098-e466fb856794%
7D/VALEGRAVES_CHA_PFT_FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
5 See HUD, HOUSING AGENCY RESPONSES TO FEDERAL DEREGULATION: AN ASSESSMENT OF
HUD’S “MOVING TO WORK” DEMONSTRATION 14-15 (2004); Joan C. Williams, The Future of Tenants’
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ownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere VI (“HOPE VI”), commenced in 1993 as a demonstration program6 and established in 1998 as a
regular U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”)
program, 7 and Moving to Work (“MTW”), a demonstration program authorized in 1996 for thirty of the roughly three thousand local PHAs. 8 These
programs enable participating PHAs to pool resources and enter into publicprivate partnerships in order to leverage private investment and seek a
broader socioeconomic mix of residents. 9 One of the participating MTW
agencies, the Atlanta Housing Authority, has imposed a strict work requirement in return for receipt of subsidized housing. 10
Proposals advanced by President Obama would expand the public
housing transformation process by authorizing all PHAs to convert their
public housing portfolios to voucher-based portfolios11 and to mortgage
public housing real estate to raise money for development and rehabilitation
of low-income housing.12 The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, added in
2009 through the HUD Fiscal Year 2010 Appropriations Act, 13 extends the
HOPE VI concept to other assisted housing programs and moves beyond
the physical boundaries of public housing developments to focus on transforming surrounding neighborhoods. 14
Rights in Assisted Housing Under a Reagan Voucher Plan: An Analysis of Section 8 Existing Housing
Cases, 23 URB. L. ANN. 3, 6 (1982).
6 Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-389, § 14, 106 Stat. 1571, 1579-81 (1992), repealed
by Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 522, 112 Stat. 2461, 2564 (1998).
7 Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1999, § 535, 112 Stat. at 2581-86 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437v
(2006)); id. § 539, 112 Stat. at 2594-96 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437z-7).
8 Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §
204, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-281 to -284 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f).
9 For HUD’s assessment of the first ten years of a projected twenty-year Moving to Work
demonstration, see HUD, MOVING TO WORK: INTERIM POLICY APPLICATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF THE
DEMONSTRATION
7
(2010),
available
at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/
huddoc?id=DOC_10134.pdf.
10 Howard Husock, Atlanta’s Public-Housing Revolution, CITY J., Autumn 2010, at 74, 76-77.
11 See infra notes 161-226 and accompanying text.
12 A HUD request for comment on its Public Housing Mortgage Program (“PHMP”) stated that
mortgages on non-dwelling units could be placed in first position, with foreclosure extinguishing any
HUD interest, but that upon foreclosure of mortgages on dwelling units, “a declaration of restrictive
covenants [would] constitute first lien position, and . . . the [public housing units would] be required to
continue to be operated in accordance with public housing requirements.” Public Housing Mortgage
Program: Notice of Web Publication, 74 Fed. Reg. 65,781, 65,781 (Dec. 11, 2009). PHMP originally
was authorized in 1998 by Section 516 of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 516, 112 Stat. 2518, 2550 (1998) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437z-2).
13 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034, 3080-81
(2009).
14 See infra notes 234-266 and accompanying text.
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Does twenty-first century America need a public agency that owns
housing? Policymakers have asked this question since the inception of the
public housing program,15 and they continued to do so in 2011.16 The debate
over what would become the public housing program began in an environment different in degree, but not in kind, from the environment of 2011. In
1933, “[a]pproximately 15 million people were out of work . . . . [and
t]housands of families were losing their homes and their farms.” 17 In 2011,
almost fourteen million people were unemployed and millions of people
faced the loss of their homes to foreclosure. 18 In the debate leading up to
enactment of the Housing Act of 1937, residential developers so feared the
competition of government-owned and operated housing that they prevailed
upon Congress to sharply restrict public housing’s reach “only [to] those
who could not afford what private enterprise was willing and able to
build.”19 In the first decade of the twenty-first century, property owners and
residents were so distrustful of very-low-income families that the Housing
Authority of Joliet, Illinois, was unable to find housing for forty-four families despite contacting one thousand property owners in the Joliet vicinity
over a five-month period.20
But the dire situation of jobless and homeless families in 1933 did not
mean the original program was going to serve very-low-income households.
Lawrence Friedman describes the attitude about the people for whom public
housing initially was intended.
[I]nfluence flowed not from the destitute, the descendants of the destitute . . . the Negro ghetto dwellers, or the abject poor; it flowed from the submerged and potential middle class. The
ideal housing act, then, would be one which would accept the new poor and reject the old

15 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING 105 (Arno Press 1978) (1968)
(mentioning the opinion of Senator David I. Walsh that “government ought not to compete with ‘private
property’” (quoting TIMOTHY L. MC DONNELL, THE WAGNER HOUSING ACT: A CASE STUDY OF THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 166 (1957))).
16 See infra Part II for a discussion on the movement toward privatizing public housing.
17 FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 100 (second alteration in original) (quoting JOSEPHINE CHAPIN
BROWN, PUBLIC RELIEF 1929-1939, at 145-46 (1940)).
18 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment Situation—
May 2011 (June 3, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_06032011.pdf;
Record 2.9 Million U.S. Properties Receive Foreclosure Filings in 2010 Despite 30-Month Low in
December, REALTYTRAC (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/record-29million-us-properties-receive-foreclosure-filings-in-2010-despite-30-month-low-in-december-6309.
19 FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 105 (describing the strong opposition of the National Association
of Real Estate Boards).
20 See infra notes 329-333 and accompanying text. The Joliet authority sought to place eightyeight families facing eviction because of an eminent domain action, but could find Section 8-assisted
housing for only forty-four of them. See infra notes 329-333 and accompanying text.

35

692

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 19:3

poor; it would shut the doors on those with the ability to get housing privately, but would not
open the doors to people on the dole and likely to stay there. 21

Homeowners in many communities so feared the impact of public housing
that they prevailed upon their local and state representatives to confine public housing developments to isolated ghettos. 22 But from its inception in
1937 to the present, public housing has been the housing program with the
deepest subsidy, the program designed for households that cannot compete
effectively in the private housing market, and since the 1950s, the program
that reaches the lowest income quadrant of society.
Questions posed in 2011 center around the future of the 1.2 million
public housing units in existence, all of which are at least forty-five years
old and most of which need substantial repairs and renovation. 23 Despite an
estimated $25 billion backlog in capital needs, Congress has reduced its
level of support for public housing considerably. The Fiscal Year (“FY”)
2012 HUD budget Congress approved in November 2011 included only
$1.88 billion for capital needs, which was 8 percent below the FY 2011
level and 22 percent below the requested amount. 24 Is it realistic to expect
Congress to appropriate the billions of dollars needed to modernize the public housing inventory in the face of the current debt and deficit concerns?
How much will the private sector invest to align public housing structures
with present standards, considering the available subsidy stream and the age
and deterioration of the inventory? Will a major emphasis on resident mo21

FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 106.
See 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (2011). State statutes typically require public housing projects to
comply with state and local building and zoning laws. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 421.13 (2007) (“All housing projects of an authority shall be subject to the planning, zoning, sanitary and building laws, ordinances and regulations applicable to the locality in which the housing project is situated. In the planning
and location of any housing project, an authority shall take into consideration the relationship of the
project to any larger plan or long-range program for the development of the area in which the housing
authority functions.”); N.Y. PUB. HOUS. LAW § 155 (McKinney 1989) (housing projects must follow the
“[z]oning regulations [and] other restrictions enacted by . . . municipalit[ies] to adequately protect the
area or areas of a project”).
23 A HUD-sponsored study estimated the total national existing capital needs for public housing to
be $25.6 billion. HUD, C APITAL NEEDS IN THE PUBLIC H OUSING PROGRAM 34 (2010), available at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=PH_Capital_Needs.pdf. The average per-unit
need was estimated to be $23,365, although existing needs for one-quarter of the units are less than
$5,248 per unit, while existing capital needs for another quarter of the units exceed $28,570. Billions in
Repairs Needed for Public Housing Stock, HUD.GOV, http://www.huduser.org/portal/periodicals/
ResearchWorks/RW_august_11.html#1 (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
24 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55, § 4, 125
Stat. 552, 679 (2011); Final FY12 Budget Cuts HUD, Rural Housing Programs, MEMO TO MEMBERS
(Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal., D.C.), Nov. 18, 2011, at 1, 2, available at http://nlihc.org/doc/
Memo16-45.pdf. HUD’s FY 2013 budget, released February 13, 2012, proposes a 10 percent increase in
the capital fund to $2.07 billion which, if enacted, would restore the fund to slightly above the FY 2011
level. HUD, FY 2013 BUDGET: H OUSING AND COMMUNITIES BUILT TO LAST, at B-1 (Feb. 13, 2012).
22
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bility and private management of public housing units undermine the resident/tenant management movement?
Part I of this Article discusses the public housing program, including a
major rent strike in St. Louis that helped lead to dramatic changes in the
administration of public housing. Part II chronicles a series of efforts by
succeeding administrations to encourage greater investment in public housing by the private sector and to reduce the role of the federal government.
Part III examines the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, the Obama Administration’s effort to transform whole neighborhoods while shoring up public
and assisted housing within those neighborhoods. Part IV asks whether
public housing has a future. The Article answers the question in the affirmative, concluding that the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative is a promising component of that future.
THE PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM

I.

The public housing program originated in the Housing Act of 1937,
which authorized federal financial support through Annual Contribution
Contracts (“ACCs”) with local PHAs for the construction of heavily subsidized rental housing units to be owned and managed by the PHAs.25 The
Act defined a PHA as any “governmental entity or public body . . . which is
authorized to engage in or assist in the development or operation of public
housing.”26 In most states, enabling legislation created independent local
PHAs but conditioned their ability to act upon a declaration by the governing body of a city or county that such an authority was needed in that jurisdiction. 27 The program was slow in getting started because of its complex
nature and the intervention of World War II. After the war, a fifteen-year
building boom following enactment of the Housing Act of 1949 produced
most of the approximately 1.4 million public housing units constructed. 28
PHAs raised funds for the construction of those units through the issuance

25

See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(a)(1) (2006); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 94-113; Peter W.
Salsich, Jr., Toward a Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming a Long History of Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459, 479 (2007).
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(6)(A); William H. Ledbetter, Jr., Public Housing—A Social Experiment Seeks Acceptance, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 490, 493-95 (1967).
27 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 99.040.1 (2000).
28 NAT’ L COMM ’N ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUB. H OUS., THE FINAL REPORT 5 (1992). The
1949 Act was a major stimulus to public housing construction. See generally Alexander von Hoffman, A
Study in Contradictions: The Origins and Legacy of the Housing Act of 1949, 11 HOUSING POL’Y
DEBATE 299, 299-303 (2000) (discussing the “bitter legislative stalemate” over the Act); Salsich, supra
note 25, at 480-81. With the enactment of programs in the 1960s and 1970s encouraging housing production by private entities, new construction of public housing units was curtailed. See infra Part I.B.
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and sale of long-term, tax-exempt municipal bonds. 29 The federal government pays principal and interest costs on those bonds in fulfillment of
commitments made through ACCs. Those commitments, in turn, are backed
by the full faith and credit of the United States. 30
While the federal government paid for public housing construction
costs through the ACC structure, maintenance costs were a local responsibility to be paid by rents received from public housing tenants. 31 In the early
years, this arrangement worked reasonably well because rents could be kept
low as a result of the federal subsidy. 32 Over time, though, changes in the
makeup of the tenant population, coupled with inflation, put heavy pressure
on the public housing rental structure and management system. 33
By the fall of 1968, public housing in the major urban centers of
America was in crisis. Thirty years after Congress created the public housing program, major shifts in the demographics of public housing residents
from predominantly white, middle-class families made “temporarily” unemployed by the Great Depression to predominantly black, chronically unemployed individuals and families had created serious budgetary pressures
for PHAs. 34 Even though the federal government picked up the tab for construction of public housing, urban PHAs faced substantial deficits in their
operating budgets because their new tenant cohort could not afford rents
high enough to cover all of the PHAs’ operating expenses. 35 To stave off
default on their obligations, many PHAs shifted from income-based rental

29

See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(a)(1); FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 108-09; Salsich, supra note 25, at

480.

30

See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(c)(3), 1437d(d); FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 108; Salsich, supra note
25, at 480.
31 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 109 (“The requirement of a rental sufficient to meet expenses
would . . . tend to restrict public housing to the honest, working poor.”).
32 Cf. id. at 109 (“The projects would mainly be filled with deserving but underpaid workers . . . .”); MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & G. THOMAS KINGSLEY, FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR
ADDRESSING LOW-INCOME HOUSING NEEDS: A POLICY PRIMER 1 (2008), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411798_low-income_housing.pdf.
33 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 119 (“In the opinion of the experts, public housing has been
misdesigned, misconceived, and misdirected.”).
34 Cf. von Hoffman, supra note 28, at 316.
35 Robert Gladstone & Assocs., The Outlook for United States Housing Needs, in THE REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT’S C OMMITTEE ON URBAN H OUSING: A DECENT HOME 54, 57 (1968) (“During the postwar years, Public Housing slowly lost many of its working class residents and came to house large
concentrations of poor families, many with serious social problems.”); id. at 61(“Given the inadequate
coverage and size of welfare payments, there are still millions of families who are too poor to live in
public housing projects. Even those who live there may have to commit a disproportionate share of their
incomes to pay the low rents.”); see also BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS 115-16 (1969) (noting “that public housing ha[d] been reaching
further down the income scale”).

2012]

DOES AMERICA NEED PUBLIC HOUSING ?

695

policies to space-based ones,36 which resulted in increased rents, particularly for families occupying three- and four-bedroom apartments. 37 The impact
of decisions to change rental policies and/or raise rents was so great that
tenants in a number of cities went on strike and refused to pay the higher
rents.38
A.

St. Louis Public Housing Rent Strike

One such strike occurred in St. Louis, Missouri. Following the
St. Louis Housing Authority’s shift from an income-based rental policy to a
space-based rental policy in November of 1968, residents in several public
housing complexes in the city protested the higher rents and stated their
willingness to begin withholding rents on February 1, 1969. 39 Tenant councils and charismatic tenant activists in the Carr-Square Village, Cochran
Gardens, Vaughn, and Blumeyer Village projects on the city’s north side
and Darst-Webbe and Clinton-Peabody on the south side, led the rent
strike.40 Pruitt-Igoe, the most well-known project because of its size and
36 See generally MAGGIE MCC ARTY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., O VERVIEW OF FEDERAL
HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND POLICY 4-8 (2008) (charting the history of income-based rent
and the shift from income-based rent programs to vouchers). Income-based rent levels will fluctuate
based on the income of the tenant. For example, an income-based rent policy may set rents at 25 or 30
percent of tenant income. Under such policies, two tenants with the same income will pay the same
amount of rent, even though one occupies a one-bedroom apartment and the other a three-bedroom one.
Space-based rent levels will fluctuate based on the size of the rental unit. For example, rent can be
$600/month for a one-bedroom apartment and $800/month for a two-bedroom apartment. Two tenants
occupying the same size and type apartment will pay the same rent, even though one tenant’s income
may equal 50 percent of the other tenant’s.
37 See generally Scott Susin, Rent Vouchers and the Price of Low-Income Housing, 83 J. PUB .
ECON. 109 (2002) (discussing the increase in rental costs for low-income households since the early
1980s).
38 See, e.g., Glenn Fowler, Tenant Activists Gaining Momentum in the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
26, 1969, § 8 at 1, 1 (“In a growing number of cities, tenants are forming associations to protect their
interests, engaging in rent strikes and on occasion throwing picket lines around their landlords’ property.”).
39 See generally Richard D. Baron, Community Organizations: Antidote for Neighborhood Succession and Focus for Neighborhood Improvement, 21 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 634, 648-54 (1978) (reviewing
the strike based on personal experience as the lead attorney for the tenants); Phillip Thigpin, Did the
Rent Strike Succeed?, FOCUS/MIDWEST, July-Aug. 1969, at 32, 32-33 (evaluating whether the rent strike
was successful in eliminating the “disparity between the continually rising costs of running public
housing, and the reduction in the ability of tenants to pay adequate rents”); see also Charles Kimball
Cummings, Rent Strike in St. Louis: The Making of Conflict in Modern Society 398-400 (January 1976)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University) (on file with Washington University Library)
(discussing the rent increases of 1968).
40 Rhonda Y. Williams, “Something’s Wrong Down Here”: Poor Black Women and Urban
Struggles for Democracy, in AFRICAN AMERICAN URBAN H ISTORY SINCE WORLD WAR II 316, 325
(Kenneth L. Kusmer & Joe W. Trotter eds., 2009).
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notoriety, 41 was not an official participant in the strike, but individual tenants in Pruitt-Igoe did withhold rents.42
When several thousand tenants withheld rents and deposited the funds
in escrow accounts at several banks, it became obvious that the striking
tenants were serious and that evicting all of the tenants who had not been
paying rent could, and most likely would, lead to chaos.43 The major stakeholders held a series of meetings during February 1969 in an effort to find a
satisfactory resolution of the rent strike. 44 This author participated in the
meetings as one of several legal aid lawyers representing tenants and others
involved with the rent strike.45
Two recollections remain from those meetings. The first concerns the
attendees. About twenty to twenty-five persons, representing various agencies and organizations, sat around a large oval conference table. As individuals introduced themselves, each one stated that his or her organization
either was not responsible for finding a solution or did not have the resources to do so, thereby creating the impression that no one in the room
was responsible.
The second recollection is of a consultant to HUD who had flown in
from Washington, D.C., for one of the meetings. After listening to the discussion, he declared that a solution to the problem would cost millions of
dollars. Stating that he did not have access to that amount of money, he
announced that he had to catch a plane and left the meeting. The cynical
definition of an expert as one who is 150 miles from home comes to mind
whenever I think of that meeting.
At the height of the rent strike in the late winter of 1969, a public hearing was held in Jefferson City, Missouri, to discuss pending state legislation
that would provide financial support for the St. Louis Housing Authority,
41 The notoriety of Pruitt-Igoe is explored in the documentary film, T HE PRUITT-IGOE MYTH (First
Run Features 2011). See Steve Giegerich, Film, Residents Recall Housing Complex, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Apr. 10, 2011, at B1, B1-B2; see also Tim O’Neil, Pruitt-Igoe’s Hopeful Vision Imploded as
Housing Failure, ST. LOUIS POST-D ISPATCH, July 25, 2010, at B2, B2 (describing the Pruitt-Igoe development as a “symbol of hopelessness” in public housing).
42 Cummings, supra note 39, at 435-36.
43 Letter from Richard S. Jones, President, Health & Welfare Council of Metro. St. Louis, Inc., to
Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Attorney, Legal Aid Soc’y, Ctr. for Urban Programs Office, Saint Louis Univ.
(Feb. 21, 1969) (on file with author) (reporting a request for a “moratorium on eviction of any tenants . . . on the grounds that such action would be detrimental to the present situation”).
44 Letter from Richard S. Jones, President, Health & Welfare Council of Metro. St. Louis, Inc., to
Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Legal Aid Soc’y for Urban Programming (Feb. 4, 1969) (on file with author)
(inviting St. Louis Mayor Alfonso J. Cervantes, government officials, and civic leaders to a meeting on
February 12, 1969, “to discuss the potential impact of the current rent strike in public housing and to
seek ways to resolve the basic issues: inadequate income of many tenants and the requirement for the
Housing Authority to operate on break-even terms”).
45 Several months earlier this author left private practice and was employed by the St. Louis Legal
Aid Society and Saint Louis University School of Law.
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enabling it to scale back its rent increases. 46 This author helped arrange for
public housing tenants to speak at the hearing. One of the spokespersons for
striking tenants was an elderly single woman who was a long-time resident
of public housing. After she finished her prepared remarks emphasizing the
need for state financial support of public housing, this author recalls that a
state representative from suburban St. Louis County asked her a few questions, the substance of which are as follows:
Q: What is your monthly income?
A: I receive $90 per month from the state Welfare Department.
Q: How much is your rent?
A: I am charged $70 per month.
Q: How do you eat?
A: The dumpsters behind my building usually have a lot of food in them. 47

I witnessed that exchange and saw the incredulous looks on the faces of the
legislators. Despite the shocking revelation concerning the woman’s living
conditions, the proposed legislation did not pass.
Tenant leadership initially aimed its efforts primarily at a return to a
more affordable, income-based rental policy (rent levels at no more than 25
percent of income), but tenant participation in public housing management
later became an additional important goal.
Repeated negotiations between HUD, City, and Authority representatives made it clear to the
rent strike leaders that a fundamental change in the institution of public housing was needed
in order to protect the interests of the residents. . . . The strike leaders became increasingly
convinced that a reduction in rent levels, without a simultaneous realignment in the traditional lines of authority and methods of operation within the Authority, would accomplish little.
Rents could always be raised again. This fact suggested both that tenants had to participate in
the management of the public housing program and in the development of policy regarding
the future operation of public housing. 48

46 See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Reform Through Legislative Action: The Poor and the Law, 13 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 373, 380-81 (1969) (discussing the Missouri legislature’s proposed legislation on public
housing in 1969).
47 This dialogue reflects the author’s best recollection.
48 Baron, supra note 39, at 649.
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The idea of tenant participation in management struck some observers as a
conflict in interest but made sense to others. 49
The rent strike was settled the following October. An ad hoc organization, the Civic Alliance for Housing, organized by local Teamsters Union
leader, Harold J. Gibbons, at the request of Ms. Jean King, one of the tenant
rent strike leaders, played a key role in negotiating a settlement. 50 Enactment of federal legislation in 1969 known as the Brooke Amendment 51 enabled the Authority to reverse its controversial rental policy. 52 The Brooke
Amendments (two additional ones were enacted in 1970 and 1971) established the principle that public housing residents did not have to pay more
than 25 percent (later raised to 30 percent) of their income for housing (rent
and utilities), 53 authorized HUD to provide operating subsidies to PHAs to
make up the difference, 54 and permitted tenants to be elected or appointed to
governing boards of PHAs.55
The Civic Alliance played a key role in implementing the tenantparticipation aspects of the settlement agreement by providing training and
technical assistance to a newly created Tenant Affairs Board (“TAB”) made
up of elected representatives from each of the nine conventional public
housing developments in the City. The Civic Alliance also provided administrative and management assistance to the Authority as it reorganized and
installed a decentralized management structure.
TAB and the Authority collaborated on creation of a series of new policies and programs, including a new standard lease form and a grievance
procedure; rent collection and extension policies; security, social services,
and modernization programs; and annual budget policies. They established
a tenant management program that enabled tenant associations to screen
prospective tenants, assist in the preparation of annual development budgets, and use modernization funds. Tenant associations helped contact delin-

49

Id. at 654 (“The tenant management program represents a pragmatic response by the St. Louis
Housing Authority to the aspirations of its public housing residents and illustrates the impact of involving indigenous community organizations in efforts to stabilize and redevelop distressed neighborhoods.”).
50 St. Louis Rent Strike Settled, 26 J. HOUSING 549, 549 (1969).
51 The amendment was named after former Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts although the
legislation originally was introduced by other former representatives, including Leonore K. Sullivan (DSt. Louis). Cf. 115 CONG. REC. 25,650 (1969).
52 Mary Schwartz & Ellen Wilson, Who Can Afford To Live in a Home?, U.S. CENSUS B UREAU 1,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/special-topics/files/who-can-afford.pdf (last visited Mar. 1,
2012).
53 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(1) (2006) (specifying that residents do not have to pay more than
30 percent of their income for housing), with 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(1) (1976) (“The rental for any dwelling
units shall not exceed one-fourth of the family’s income . . . .”).
54 42 U.S.C. § 1437g(c)(1) (2006).
55 Id. § 1437c-1(e)(1).
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quent tenants 56 and handled rent extension questions along with social service referrals.57
Two years later, a series of Ford Foundation grants enabled the Authority to establish tenant management corporations in five public housing
developments.58 The experience in St. Louis helped spur a nationwide
movement toward tenant management, but the movement lost steam due to
continuing budgetary pressures on public housing and tenant difficulties in
keeping their heads above water. However, the principle of tenant representation on housing authority governing boards, as well as establishment of
resident advisory boards at individual public housing developments, became accepted policy.
Perhaps the high point of the tenant management movement came in
1988 when then president Ronald Reagan invited three leaders of the
movement to join him while he signed the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987: Kimi Gray of Kenilworth-Parkside Resident Management Corporation in Washington, D.C.; Bertha Gilkey of Cochran Tenant Management Corporation in St. Louis, Missouri; and Mildred Hailey,
the founder of the tenant management movement at the Bromley-Heath
Tenant Management Corporation in Boston, Massachusetts. 59 President
Reagan’s three female guests, and the organizations they headed, became
national symbols of the tenant management movement. “[T]hey remind us
that ownership or control of one’s own residence should be an opportunity
for every citizen,” he stressed. 60
The movement faltered in the 1990s. While the movement gave tenants a sense of control over their environments, it did not succeed in improving the living conditions in urban public housing. A negative audit by
the HUD Inspector General in 1995 led to concerns about the future of the
tenant (now resident) management movement. 61 The 1998 Housing Act 62
threw a lifeline to functioning resident management corporations (“RMCs”)
56

Tenant representatives were very conscientious and often tougher on their colleagues than
traditional management, as this author discovered while serving as an advisor to the Carr Square TAB.
On several occasions this author had to remind TAB members that statutory tenant protections, such as
notice and an opportunity to be heard before eviction, had to be observed.
57 Baron, supra note 39, at 653.
58 Id. at 653-55.
59 Remarks on Signing the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, 24 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 175, 176 (1988) (President Ronald Reagan).
60 Id.
61 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., HUD AUDIT REPORT NO. 95-HQ-154-0002, at 4 (Aug. 31,
1995), available at http://archives.hud.gov/offices/oig/reports/internal/ig5h0002.pdf; see also
C. THEODORE KOEBEL & MARILYN S. CAVELL, TENANT ORGANIZATIONS IN PUBLIC H OUSING
PROJECTS: A REPORT ON SENATE RESOLUTION N O. 347, at 6-7 (1995), available at
http://www.vchr.vt.edu/pdfreports/phtext2.pdf (discussing OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra).
62 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 532, 112 Stat.
2461, 2574-75 (1998) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437r (2006)).

39

700

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 19:3

by requiring PHAs to make a portion of their capital and operating funds
available to RMCs that assume “primary management responsibilities” if
the RMCs request management funds from HUD and HUD “determines
that the corporation[s have] the capability to effectively discharge such responsibilities.”63
But, as the Boston Globe noted in a November 14, 2010, editorial,
“over the years, it grew harder to maintain a base of highly motivated tenants willing to undergo the intensive training” necessary to become successful managers.64 For example, the Chicago Housing Authority declined to
renew its contract with the Cabrini-Green Rowhouse Resident Management
Corp. in 200565 in preparation for the closing and demolition of the CabriniGreen project.66 By 2010, the Bromley-Heath resident management corporation was one of only six such corporations remaining in existence. 67
Housing Production Shift to Private Sector Focus

B.

Most public housing units continued to provide decent housing for
low-income households. However, serious controversies over the location
and condition of high-rise public housing complexes within isolated urban
ghettos led Congress and the country to shift focus to the private sector in
the 1960s and 1970s.68 Remarkably, the public housing complexes that elicited such a spirited reaction constituted less than 10 percent of the 1.4 million total public housing units in operation. 69 No new public housing developments were authorized after 1965 as federal support for housing production shifted to private developers through the Section 236 interest subsidy
program authorized in 196870 and the Section 8 new construction and substantial rehabilitation rental subsidy programs authorized in 1974.71 An additional shift in emphasis from supply-side housing production support to
demand-side tenant rental support led Congress to repeal the Section 8 new
63

42 U.S.C. § 1437r(e)(1).
Lawrence Harmon, Op-Ed., Landlord in Residence, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 14, 2010, at K9, K9.
65 Andrew L. Wang, Cabrini Tenants Blast New Management Firm, C HI. TRIB., Nov. 10, 2005, §
2, at 4.
66 Pat Curry, Last Cabrini Green High-Rise Coming Down Today, WGN-TV (Mar. 30, 2011, 5:31
AM), http://www.wgntv.com/news/local/breaking/chibrknews-last-cabrini-green-building-comes-downtoday-20110330,0,6236705.story; Monroe, supra note 1.
67 See Harmon, supra note 64, at K9.
68 See Salsich, supra note 25, at 482-83 (discussing the 1974 enactment of a housing program
designed to give private housing developers incentives to provide substitutes for public housing).
69 See id. at 462 n.10.
70 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-152, § 107, 83 Stat. 379, 381
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (2006)).
71 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201, 88 Stat. 633,
662-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f).
64
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construction and substantial rehabilitation programs in 198372 in favor of
Section 8 existing housing certificates and vouchers.73 Both programs were
merged into the Housing Choice Voucher program in 1998, which local
PHAs administered. 74 As the name implies, the Housing Choice Voucher
program places responsibility on prospective low-income tenants to locate
private landlords willing to accept a voucher as a portion of the rent. 75
Despite the fact that the original subsidy of public housing, payment of
the capital costs of new construction, continues to be the deepest housing
subsidy ever created in the United States,76 tenant rents do not and cannot
cover the full cost of managing and maintaining the rental units owned by
housing authorities. Lingering effects of the public housing rent strikes,
coupled with a general consensus that urban high-rise public housing developments had become undesirable urban ghettos, led to a series of experiments seeking answers to what had become an intractable problem—
thousands of extremely low-income households trapped for generations in
poorly designed, obsolete, and deteriorating high-rise slums. In the six
years between 1992 and 1998, five demonstration programs were established: Moving to Opportunity, Family Self-Sufficiency, Jobs-Plus, Moving
to Work, and HOPE VI.77
1.

Moving to Opportunity

In 1992, Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing (“MTO”) engaged
five large housing authorities in a demonstration of the potential alleviation
of poverty through dispersal by means of vouchers coupled with extensive
counseling.78 Of the twenty-one largest PHAs invited to apply, the housing
72

Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 209(a)(1)-(2), 97 Stat. 1153,
1183 (amending Section 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a), (b)(2) (1982), by substituting “existing housing” for
“existing, newly constructed, and substantially rehabilitated housing” and deleting authorization for
“assistance payments for newly constructed or substantial rehabilitated” assisted housing).
73 Section 8 certificates, authorized in 1974, are attached to units owned by private landlords and
provide payments to those landlords to make up the difference between fair market rents approved by
HUD and tenant rental payments that are limited to 30 percent of tenant income. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1437a(a), 1437f(c)(3) (2006). Section 8 vouchers, authorized in 1983, are provided to qualified
tenants enabling them to negotiate a lease with a private landlord. Id. § 1437f(d).
74 Id. § 1437(b)(1).
75 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.302 (2011).
76 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-76, FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE :
COMPARING THE CHARACTERISTICS AND COSTS OF H OUSING PROGRAMS 4 (2002), available at
www.gao.gov/new.items/d0276.pdf.
77 Rachel Garshick Kleit & Stephen B. Page, Public Housing Authorities Under Devolution, 74 J.
AM. PLAN. ASS’N 34, 36-37 (2008).
78 John Goering et al., What Have We Learned about Housing Mobility and Poverty
Deconcentration?, in CHOOSING A BETTER LIFE?: EVALUATING THE MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY SOCIAL
EXPERIMENT 3, 6-7 (John M. Goering & Judith D. Feins eds., 2003).
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authorities of Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York
City were selected.79 MTO “tests the impact of housing counseling and other assistance on the housing choices of Section 8 households . . . [with the
goal of developing] more effective mobility strategies for recipients of tenant-based housing assistance.”80
2.

Family Self-Sufficiency

The Family Self-Sufficiency (“FSS”) program, created by Section 554
of the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, 81
sought ways to provide necessary social services to enable public housing
residents to become self-sufficient.82 It required participating housing authorities to provide the services themselves or negotiate with third parties
for the services. 83 FSS, a successor to Project Self-Sufficiency and Operation Bootstrap,84 is an active program that receives annual funding from the
Housing Choice Voucher-FSS escrow.85 Participating families enter into a
five-year “contract of participation” with their housing authorities that
spells out the steps both parties will take as the family seeks economic independence. 86 As families’ earned income increases, a portion of their increased rent is deposited in an interest-bearing escrow account maintained
by the housing authority. 87 Upon successfully completing the five-year program, families receive the funds that have accrued in their escrow accounts,
which they can use as they see fit. 88
79

Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing, HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/
programdescription/mto (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
80 Id.
81 Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 554, 104 Stat.
4079, 4225 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437u (2006)).
82 42 U.S.C. § 1437u.
83 Kleit & Page, supra note 77, at 36.
84 HUD established Project Self Sufficiency in 1984 to demonstrate the potential of providing
social services, housing assistance, job training, and job placement in a “comprehensive and coordinated” way to very-low-income single parents. Press Release, PR Newswire, HUD Official to Announce
Project Self Sufficiency (Oct. 9, 1984), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-3470356.html.
Five years later, HUD’s Operation Bootstrap initiative made a similar services package available to all
low-income families in sixty-one PHAs, rather than limiting the program to single-parent families. HUD
provided two rounds of Section 8 voucher funding in FY 1989 and 1990, then repla ced it with the FSS
program.
See
OPERATION
BOOTSTRAP
REPORT,
HUD.GOV
(Mar.
30,
2005),
http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/pubasst/bootstrp.html.
85 Housing ChoiceVoucher (HCV) Family Self-Sufficiency, HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.gov/
hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/fss (last visited Mar. 1,
2012).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See id. HUD reports that many families use the funds for housing, debt reduction, college
education, or starting a business. HUD, EVALUATION OF THE FAMILY SELF -SUFFICIENCY PROGRAM :
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A four-year study of a sample of FSS participants, the second of three
planned analyses of the program, reported that FSS program graduates during that four-year period had accumulated an average of $5,300 in their
escrow accounts, approximately 27 percent of their income upon entering
the program.89 During the four-year study period, 24 percent of 170 study
participants successfully graduated, 37 percent withdrew, and 39 percent
remained enrolled. 90 The study suggests that families that remain in and
graduate from the FSS program receive substantial benefits. 91 Based in part
on the results of this study, HUD awarded more than two hundred PHAs
almost $15 million to continue enrolling housing authority residents in the
FSS program.92 What may be the first “closed-end rental agreement” requiring public housing residents who are not elderly or disabled to obtain jobs
and agree to leave their units within five years is being promulgated by the
Chattanooga, Tennessee, Housing Authority for an eighteen-unit development that will replace twenty-eight 1970s-vintage public housing units that
were demolished in 2010.93 The Chattanooga FSS Program will assist residents in preparing for self-sufficiency by establishing escrow accounts on
their behalf.94
3.

Jobs-Plus

Jobs-Plus, a 1998 demonstration program, utilized six urban housing
authorities (Baltimore, Chattanooga, Dayton, Los Angeles, St. Paul, and
Seattle) “to test the impact of saturated, community-based employment
services on public housing residents’ ability to secure and retain jobs.” 95
The Jobs-Plus programs combined three “core elements”:
(1) “Employment-related services”; (2) “Financial incentives to work”; and

PROSPECTIVE
STUDY
2
(2011),
available
at
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/
FamilySelfSufficiency.pdf.
89 HUD, supra note 88, at 45.
90 Id.
91 Id. at x.
92 Press Release, HUD, HUD Awards $15 Million to Help Public Housing Residents Obtain Jobs,
Economic Independence (May 27, 2011), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/
press_releases_media_advisories/2011/HUDNo.11-104.
93 Yolanda Putman, Chattanooga: New Public Housing Units Will Require Residents To Be Out in
Five Years, T IMESFREEPRESS.COM (June 21, 2011), http://timesfreepress.com/news/2011/jun/21/
chattanooga-new-public-housing-units-will-require-/.
94 Id.
95 Kleit & Page, supra note 77, at 36 (citing James A. Riccio, A Research Framework for Evaluating Jobs-Plus: A Saturation and Place-Based Employment Initiative for Public Housing Residents
(MDRC Working Paper, May 1998), available at http://www.mdrc.org/publications/151/
workpaper.html).
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(3) “Community support for work.”96 During the four years (2000–2003)
that the Jobs-Plus program was active, participating residents in a study
sample experienced average earnings increases of 6 percent. 97 A later study
followed participants at three of the sites (Dayton, Los Angeles, and
St. Paul) until 2006 because those three sites were able to maintain all three
core elements.98 During that period, participants’ earnings increased by an
average of “14 percent over the amounts earned by the comparison
group.”99 While employment impacts were smaller than the earnings impacts, study directors concluded that “there is untapped potential for the
housing system—working with institutional partners—to increase the earnings of the people who depend on it for housing assistance.”100
4.

Moving to Work

In 1996, MTW recruited eighteen housing authorities, later expanded
in stages to thirty-three, to test the potential of allowing local housing authorities greater flexibility in the use of public housing, Section 8, operating
assistance, and modernization funds.101 Combined funds may be used, under
MTW agreements between PHAs and HUD, for a variety of activities, including supportive housing, homeless/transitional housing, local rental subsidy programs, homeownership assistance, gap financing, tax credit partnerships, services for low-income non-residents, and supportive services
subsidies for low-income families. 102 In 2008, HUD entered into MTW
agreements with twenty-nine participating PHAs that extended their participation in the MTW program until 2018. 103 The proposed Section 8 Voucher
Reform Act includes a provision that would allow up to eighty state and
local housing authorities to participate in the MTW program. 104
96 JAMES A. R ICCIO, MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH C ORP., SUSTAINED EARNINGS
GAINS FOR RESIDENTS IN A PUBLIC HOUSING J OBS PROGRAM 2-3 (2010), available at
http://www.mdrc.org/publications/542/policybrief.pdf.
97 Id. at 3.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 5-6.
101 Kleit & Page, supra note 77, at 36-37.
102 HUD, NOTICE PIH-2011-45 (HA), PARAMETERS FOR LOCAL, NON-TRADITIONAL ACTIVITIES
UNDER THE MOVING TO W ORK DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM 3-4 (2011), available at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=11-45pihn.doc.
103 See History of Moving to Work (MTW), HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/mtw/history (last visited Mar. 1,
2012).
104 Will Fischer, Sharp Expansion of HUD’s “Moving-to-Work” Demonstration Raises Serious
Concerns, CENTER BUDGET & POL’ Y PRIORITIES 1 (2010), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-2210hous.pdf (“Unless important limitations are added, this expansion would reduce the number of families receiving housing assistance by shifting funds out of the Section 8 housing voucher program. It also
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HOPE VI

HOPE VI105 has provided competitive grants since 1993 to encourage
the leveraging of private capital in order to transform urban high-rise public
housing projects into low-rise, mixed-income neighborhoods.106 HOPE VI
began on a demonstration basis following publication of a report in 1992
that referred to severely distressed public housing as “a national disgrace.”107 In response to recommendations of the National Commission on
Severely Distressed Public Housing, Congress authorized the Urban Revitalization Demonstration (“URD”), the precursor to HOPE VI, as part of
HUD’s FY 1993 appropriation.108 URD grants were made to urban PHAs to
enable them to demolish severely distressed projects and build new public
housing with social services provided to their residents. 109
Near the end of URD’s first year, Richard Baron, a St. Louis developer
who had been the lead attorney for the tenants during the previously discussed St. Louis public housing rent strike, 110 wrote a memo to HUD officials proposing to expand the URD program by authorizing PHAs to leverage URD funds with low-income housing tax credit equity, 111 and other
state and local resources. 112 When Nelson Diaz, HUD’s general counsel in
1994, opined that nothing in the public housing enabling statute prevented a
private entity from owning public housing so long as it “followed the rules
that applied to public housing,” the basic structure of HOPE VI was estabwould expose more low-income families to risky policies than is necessary to test innovative approaches, and allow local policies to diverge to a degree that could weaken housing assistance programs.”).
105 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437v, 1437z-7 (2006). The HOPE program was introduced as a homeownership
program for low-income families in the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L.
No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990).
106 See Kleit & Page, supra note 77, at 36 (explaining that HOPE VI sought to achieve its goal of
redeveloping thousands of distressed public housing units in part by requiring participating PHAs “to
leverage private revenues to complement HOPE VI funds”).
107 NAT’ L COMM’N ON SEVERELY D ISTRESSED PUB. H OUS ., supra note 28, at 2.
108 Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571, 1579 (1992); NAT’L COMM’N ON
SEVERELY D ISTRESSED PUB. H OUS., supra note 28, at 31.
109 See Kleit & Page, supra note 77, at 36
110 See supra notes 39-60 and accompanying text.
111 The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”) was created by the 1986 Tax Reform Act and
is codified at I.R.C. § 42 (2006). The LIHTC offers a dollar for dollar credit against ordinary income for
ten years in return for a fifteen-year commitment to provide affordable housing. Alex Schwartz & Edwin Meléndez, After Year 15: Challenges to the Preservation of Housing Financed with Low-Income
Housing Tax Credits, 19 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 261, 263 (2008). Developers are able to raise equity
for affordable housing developments by selling these credits to investors, usually through the mechanism of syndicated limited partnerships. Id. at 265.
112 Richard D. Baron, The Evolution of HOPE VI as a Development Program, in FROM DESPAIR
TO HOPE: HOPE VI AND THE NEW PROMISE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN AMERICA’S C ITIES 31, 31-35 (Henry G. Cisneros & Lora Engdahl eds., 2009).
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lished. 113 In 1998, HOPE VI became a permanent HUD program with enactment of legislation authorizing PHAs to “own, operate, assist, or otherwise participate in” mixed-finance projects,114 and authorizing HUD to
make grants to such agencies to enable them to participate in public-private
partnerships seeking to develop mixed-income, mixed-financed housing. 115
Since the program’s inception, HUD has awarded 254 HOPE VI
grants, totaling more than $6.1 billion, to 132 local PHAs.116 Displacement
has been an issue with HOPE VI, as approximately 84 percent of resident
households moved from HOPE VI sites, “most with relocation assistance,
to private-market housing, mixed-income developments, or other traditional
public housing sites.”117 Reported cases tend to focus on allegations that
racial discrimination is behind the displacement in HOPE VI projects. 118
The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative was developed to respond to weaknesses and limitations in the HOPE VI program. 119
In addition to authorizing the HOPE VI program, the Quality Housing
and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 made major changes in the public
housing program, most of which were designed to give housing authorities
greater flexibility in managing units under their control.120 One of the major
changes was the creation of a separate Public Housing Capital Fund with
the merger of the Comprehensive Grant Program (which applies to housing
authorities with more than 250 units) and the Comprehensive Improvement
113

Id. at 37.
Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 539, 112 Stat. 2461, 2594 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437z-7 (2006)).
115 Id. § 535, 112 Stat. at 2581(codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1437v).
116 Choice Neighborhoods: History and HOPE, EVIDENCE MATTERS (HUD Off. Pol’y Dev. &
Res., D.C.), Winter 2011, at 3, available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/periodicals/em/EMnewsletter_FNL_web.pdf.
117 Id. at 5 (citing Susan J. Popkin et al., Has HOPE VI Transformed Residents’ Lives? New Evidence from the HOPE VI Panel Study, 24 HOUSING STUD. 477, 486 (2009)).
118 See, e.g., Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 898, 902-04 (8th
Cir. 2005) (holding legitimate, non-discriminatory policy objectives supported decision to approve
HOPE VI revitalization proposal); Thompson v. HUD, 220 F.3d 241, 243-44, 248-50 (4th Cir. 2000)
(holding approval of HOPE VI plan modification changing project from rehabilitation of public housing
family units to new construction of elderly units violated provision of consent decree settling fair hou sing class action lawsuit). See generally MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL ET AL., THE UNCHARTED, UNCERTAIN
FUTURE OF HOPE VI REDEVELOPMENTS: THE CASE FOR ASSESSING PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 1 (2009)
(discussing and generally supporting the HOPE VI concept but arguing that sustainability is unknown);
SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL., A DECADE OF HOPE VI: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY CHALLENGES 2
(2004) (commenting that HOPE VI was an “ambitious effort to build economically integrated communities and give existing residents more choice in the private housing market”).
119 See infra Part III for a more detailed discussion of the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative.
120 See supra note 114-115 and accompanying text. See generally Kleit & Page, supra note 77, at
37-40 (discussing the 1998 Act’s changes to public housing); Peter W. Salsich, Jr. & Nathan A. Orr,
Legislative Note—Congress Approves Major Housing Legislation, 8 J. AFFORDABLE H OUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 175 (1999) (discussing the 1998 Act).
114
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Assistance Program (which applies to housing authorities with fewer than
250 units) in order to provide financial assistance for renovating aging public housing units, “an acknowledgment that the funding formula supporting
PHAs did not cover the actual costs of managing and maintaining public
housing in serviceable physical condition.”121
Continued efforts to correct public housing ills, including the HOPE
VI program aimed at replacing blighted high-rise urban ghettos with new
mixed-income, mixed-use urban neighborhoods, resulted in some improvements but did not resolve the budgetary problems of urban PHAs or
the isolation of most urban public housing residents. HOPE VI, in using a
mixed-financing, mixed-income model, “shift[ed] the emphasis of housing
policy from output (units built and managed) to outcomes—housing quality, safety, resident outcomes, economic opportunity, and the vitality of the
surrounding neighborhood.”122 A continuing study of the impact of HOPE
VI on residents of five public housing developments receiving HOPE VI
funds concluded that residents “improved the quality of their housing” and
“felt significantly safer and less fearful of crime,” but they did not experience improvement in employment prospects or self-sufficiency.123 The
study authors noted, though, that employment outcomes improved significantly in Chicago “when tenants left public housing either by using vouchers or moving into mixed-income housing.”124 HUD officials believe the
research findings “speak volumes about the most intractable barriers to
fighting the consequences of concentrated poverty.”125 Many HOPE VI residents “remained economically at risk or were in poor health” despite improvements in the quality and safety of their neighborhoods. 126
Sheila Crowley, executive director of the National Low-Income Housing Coalition (“NLIHC”), criticizes the implementation of HOPE VI because of the resulting “involuntary displacement of tens of thousands of
poor, predominantly African American families from their homes and
communities.”127 She acknowledges that HOPE VI has resulted in better
housing in safer neighborhoods for significant numbers of relocated households. 128 However, she argues it has had the effect of “disempowering” res-

121

Kleit & Page, supra note 77, at 35.
Choice Neighborhoods: History and HOPE, supra note 116, at 3.
123 Id. at 5.
124 Id. (citing VALE & GRAVES, supra note 4, at 72).
125 Id. at 6.
126 Id. (citing Susan J. Popkin, A Glass Half Empty? New Evidence from the HOPE VI Panel
Study, 20 H OUSING POL’ Y DEBATE 43, 43-63 (2010)).
127 Sheila Crowley, HOPE VI: What Went Wrong, in FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE , supra note 112, at
229, 229-30 (stating that over 72,000 households had been relocated from public housing between 1993
and 2008 as a result of HOPE VI grants).
128 See id. at 232 (“The one improvement that studies of HOPE VI outcomes have consistently
shown is that people feel safer. . . . While families that relocated with vouchers are in safer neighbor122
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idents.129 Resident participation in the planning and implementation of
HOPE VI grants “has been weak and ineffectual,” and many residents who
were not able to return to new HOPE VI units felt “misled . . . that the redevelopment was really for them.”130 She further argues that HUD “failed to
accurately assess the serious challenges” public housing residents encounter
in their daily lives; it thus failed to provide an appropriate level of social
and economic support.131
In a May 2010 visit to St. Louis, HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan reflected on the failure of urban, high-rise public housing, exemplified by the
long-ago demolished Pruitt-Igoe project in the city, which he considers “the
most potent symbol in the country of the failure of what was an ambitious
experiment in not only developing public housing but also . . . in rethinking
cities that have been over decades suffering broader post-industrial decline
and the ravages of segregation and concentrated poverty.” 132 The demolition
of the Pruitt-Igoe in 1974 led to “‘a withdrawing of ambition not only for
architects but (also for) planners, policymakers (and) urban officials’, [he]
said. ‘But I think what has emerged over the last decade is a new sense of
ambition . . . directed really in a very different way.’” 133
Racial segregation has plagued the public housing program from its
inception.134 For example, the plan for the infamous Pruitt-Igoe public housing project in St. Louis designated the 1134-unit William L. Igoe apartments for whites and the 1736-unit Wendell Oliver Pruitt Homes for
blacks. 135 Before long, black families occupied virtually the entire development because of the reluctance of white families to reside there. 136 Ten years
of class action litigation in the Chicago case, Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,137 brought the problem to national attention. Court approval
of a metropolitan-wide remedy featuring the use of housing vouchers 138 led
hoods and higher-quality housing, they also face higher levels of economic hardship and housing instability . . . .”).
129 Id. at 234.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 234-37.
132 Editorial, Unfinished Business: Ghosts of Pruitt-Igoe Stir New Ambitions for Urban Revival,
ST. LOUIS POST-D ISPATCH, June 7, 2010, at A12 (alteration in original) (quoting Shaun Donovan, HUD
Secretary) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133 Id. (first, second, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Shaun Donovan).
134 Friedman, supra note 15, at 123 (“Race discrimination in public housing was at one time fairly
open and explicit.”).
135 Alexander von Hoffman, Why They Built Pruitt-Igoe, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR
HOMES 180, 197 (John F. Bauman et al. eds., 2d prtg. 2003).
136 See id.
137 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
138 See Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 931-32, 939 (7th Cir. 1974) (describing the
posture of the litigation and how the plaintiffs had won their case back in 1969 but were now at risk of
losing the “war” requiring the rapid implementation of a comprehensive plan), aff’d sub nom. Hills v.
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Salsich, supra note 25, at 481.
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to a consent decree providing major changes in the manner in which members of the Gautreaux class were to be housed. 139 Another twenty years
would pass before the 7,100 families affected by the consent decree would
secure residence in private housing.140
Despite the Gautreaux litigation and numerous other cases around the
country,141 the problem of racial segregation in public and assisted housing
is far from being solved. A penetrating analysis of post-Katrina New Orleans by Tulane Law Professor Stacy E. Seicshnaydre makes that point
clear.142 The heart of her article is a detailed examination of actions taken by
neighborhood groups and suburban communities to block plans announced
by the Housing Authority of New Orleans and other government agencies
to rebuild New Orleans by encouraging movement of affordable housing
away from low-lying areas and toward a less concentrated environment. In
doing so, she describes what she terms the conflict between “two impulses
pulling in opposite directions that operate in tandem to perpetuate concentrated poverty and segregation.” 143 “One impulse,” to which people she
terms the “anywhere-ists” respond, “is to take any affordable housing that
can be acquired and use it to meet critical housing shortages.” 144 The other
impulse, to which “nowhere-ists” respond, is to “block affordable housing
in all forms.”145 The “‘path of least resistance’ for both groups is . . . continued creation of government-assisted housing in impoverished, isolated, or
resegregating communities.” 146 Professor Seicshnaydre reaches three conclusions: the “path of least resistance” is not compatible with fair housing
law, regional distribution and management of government-assisted housing
is essential for compliance with fair housing mandates, and “federal inter-

139

See Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 668-69 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (evaluating challenges to
the propriety of the negotiations leading to the consent decree based on exclusion of affected parties),
aff’d sub nom. Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982).
140 ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX: A STORY OF SEGREGATION, H OUSING,
AND THE BLACK GHETTO 243-44 (2006). See generally id. (telling the full story of the litigation from the
perspective of Alexander Polikoff, the lead counsel for the original plaintiff, the late Dorothy
Gautreaux).
141 See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 269-70 (1977)
(holding that minorities adversely affected by a denial of a rezoning application necessary to proceed
with a subsidized housing project did not make a sufficient showing of discriminatory purpose); Arthur
v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that referenda led by opponents of public
housing projects to repeal necessary sewer extension ordinances did not have discriminatory purpose or
effect); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1068-69 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that a municipality
cannot operate its public housing in a discriminatory manner).
142 See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, How Government Housing Perpetuates Racial Segregation: Lessons
from Post-Katrina New Orleans, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 661, 662 (2011).
143 Id. at 671.
144 Id. at 671-72.
145 Id. at 672.
146 Id. at 673.
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vention in the housing market must encompass more than [merely] providing a subsidy.”147
MOVES TOWARD PRIVATIZING PUBLIC HOUSING

II.

During the thirty-plus-year transformation from federal support for
construction of new public housing units to the Housing Choice Voucher
program, federal appropriations for repairs, maintenance, and overall management of the 1.4 million public housing units that had been constructed
decreased considerably. One study noted that funds for housing assistance
programs, including public housing maintenance and operations were cut
almost in half, from $56.4 billion to $29.2 billion per year (in 2004 constant
dollars) between 1976 and 2004, while funding for vouchers rose to $37.3
billion in 2004, an increase of over 400 percent since 1976.148 By FY 2012,
total funding for all HUD programs had been reduced to $37.4 billion, a 9
percent cut from FY 2011.149 The last three presidential administrations
have sought to move the federal government away from its direct responsibility for administering the public housing program and closer to a program
that private actors would own and operate.
A.

HUD Reinvention: From Blueprint to Reinvention

In 1995, the Clinton Administration introduced a series of proposals
designed to shift federal housing policy from the public housing program to
a system of tenant-based certificates. The Administration’s proposal, included in a proposed reorganization of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD Reinvention: From Blueprint to Action, called for a
three-year “transition from public housing to tenant based assistance,” with
larger PHAs to be given two additional years to complete the transition. 150
In commenting on the proposal several months later, then-HUD Secretary
Henry Cisneros argued that the existing system of capital and operating
subsidies, and complex management rules should be replaced with a system
that required public and assisted housing managers to compete with “simi-

147

Id. at 673, 708-18 (first internal quotation marks omitted).
CUSHING N. DOLBEARE ET AL., CHANGING PRIORITIES: THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND HOUSING
ASSISTANCE 1976-2005, at 4 (2004), available at http://www.nlihc.org/doc/cp04.pdf; see also Kleit &
Page, supra note 77, at 34-38 (describing the decreased role of the federal government in both the management and funding of public housing).
149 Final FY12 Budget Cuts HUD, Rural Housing Programs, supra note 24, at 1. HUD’s FY 2013
budget proposes to cut another $1.8 billion from HUD’s discretionary budget authority. HUD, supra
note 24, at B-5.
150 HUD, HUD REINVENTION: FROM BLUEPRINT TO ACTION 43 (1995).
148
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larly priced housing for the assisted tenants.”151 If they did not “improve the
quality of their housing,” they would “go the way of the dinosaur.”152
Two different ideas competed for attention in Congress at that time:
(1) convert public housing to vouchers to maximize tenant mobility and
choice regarding where to live, and (2) convert funding to block grants to
states to improve efficiency through competition. 153 Congress did not accept
the Administration’s full proposal, but the 1998 Housing Act did take several steps in the direction of privatization, including authorization of the
HOPE VI program, consolidation of PHA funding into two accounts (a
capital account and an operating account), and limited authorization for
PHAs to seek private sector investment.154
B.

Public Housing Reinvestment Initiative

Several attempts were made during the Bush Administration to respond to the increasing backlog in public housing maintenance and preservation activity. In 2003 and 2004, HUD proposed a Public Housing Reinvestment Initiative (“PHRI”) that would have shifted funding of public
housing maintenance and capital expenditure needs from congressional
appropriations to private sector mortgage financing. 155 Former HUD Secretary Mel Martinez, in testimony before a House subcommittee, called PHRI
“our vision for the future of public housing,” and “also [one that] will encourage development-based financial management and accountability in
PHAs.”156
PHRI would authorize HUD to approve PHAs’ requests to convert
public housing developments, or units, to project-based vouchers, which
would make it possible for PHAs to pledge the public housing property as
collateral for private capital improvement loans. 157 The 2004 proposal added
151 Henry G. Cisneros, Legacy for a Reinvented HUD: Charting a New Course in Changing and
Demanding Times, 1 CITYSCAPE 145, 148 (1995), available at http://www.huduser.org/Periodicals/
CITYSCPE/VOL1NUM3/cisneros.pdf.
152 Id.
153 The Administration’s Proposal to Preserve and Transform Public and Assisted Housing: The
Transforming Rental Assistance Initiative: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong.
173 n.5 (2010) [hereinafter Hearing] (letter from nineteen urban academic scholars).
154 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437g(a)-(e) (2006) (originally enacted as Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 519, 112 Stat. 2518, 2551 (1998)) (providing for both a
capital and operating fund for PHAs, while also authorizing housing authorities to develop housing
projects using a mix of private and federal funding).
155 See HUD, PUBLIC H OUSING REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE 2 (2003), http://www.hud.gov/offices/
pih/publications/phri_brochure.pdf.
156 Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2004: Hearings on H.R. 2861 and S. 1584 Before the H. Subcomm.
of the Comm. on Appropriations, 108th Cong. 17 (2003) (statement of Mel Martinez).
157 Id.
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a federal guarantee of up to 80 percent of loan principal.158 The FY 2004
budget request included $131 million to enable HUD to guarantee almost
$2 billion in loans.159 Congress did not fund PHRI, and the Bush Administration did not pursue the matter.160
C.

Transforming Rental Assistance (TRA/PETRA)

Responding to the loss of over 150,000 public housing units through
demolition or sale and a backlog of maintenance and rehabilitation requirements potentially exceeding $20 billion, 161 the Obama Administration
proposed the Transforming Rental Assistance (“TRA”) initiative, a major
restructuring of public housing as well as numerous private rental assistance
programs. 162 TRA was presented legislatively in 2010, first as the Preservation, Enhancement and Transformation Assistance Act (“PETRA”), and
later that year as the Rental Housing Revitalization Act (“RHRA”).163
The President included PETRA in his FY 2011 Budget Request. 164 The
proposal sought to preserve 300,000 public housing units in the first year
and an increasing number in subsequent years by reorganizing the administration of rental assistance programs and by encouraging housing authorities to leverage billions of dollars in private capital by borrowing from private investors.165
HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan, in a statement released with the proposed PETRA legislation, identified three fundamental principles guiding
PETRA. First, the legislation will change how public housing developments
are financed, not who owns them or can live in them. 166 “What this bill
won’t do is ‘privatize’ public housing,” he emphasized.167 Second, PETRA
is designed to lessen the complexity resulting from multiple rental assistance programs by merging other rental assistance programs “with our core
Section 8 program, creating new opportunities for long-term property based
contracts to preserve these units.”168 The third principle is to “encourage
resident choice” and “allow us to provide portable vouchers to residents so
158

Id.
Id.
160 See Hearing, supra note 153, at 173.
161 Id. at 47 (written testimony of Shaun Donovan, HUD Sec’y); see also PETRA, and What It
Means for the “Public” in “Public Housing”, SHELTERFORCE, Spring 2010, at 30, 30.
162 See Hearing, supra note 153, at 173.
163 See infra notes 173, 187 and accompanying text.
164 PETRA, and What It Means for the “Public” in “Public Housing”, supra note 161, at 30.
165 Id.
166 Shaun Donovan, Making Public Housing Work for Families, H UFFINGTON POST (May 26,
2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shaun-donovan/making-public-housing-wor_b_590407.html.
167 Id.
168 Id.
159
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they can move to another unit if needed, but also allow us to preserve the
original unit for another vulnerable family.”169
Secretary Donovan stressed that the three principles guiding the
PETRA legislation are designed to build a “strong foundation” for public
and assisted housing, and “put an end to the parallel system” of housing in
which the 2.5 million poor families served by HUD’s oldest programs
live. 170 Invoking Brown v. Board of Education,171 Secretary Donovan asserted, “I believe a separate housing system for low-income families is also
inherently unequal.”172
1.

Draft Legislation

The proposed PETRA legislation173 made three findings related to the
current state of housing administration:
(1) HUD “provides rental assistance to more than 4.8 million households through at least 13 different programs that are implemented through
an infrastructure comprised of some 4,200 public housing agencies . . . 18,000 individual Federal contracts with private owners, and hundreds of non-profit rental program administrators”;174
(2) “[S]ubstantial unmet capital needs” of public and assisted housing
units “hinder [government] efforts to provide safe, high-quality, sustainable, energy-efficient affordable housing”;175
(3) The current arrangement “unnecessarily increases transaction
costs,” adds to the difficulty of obtaining rental assistance, “impedes fair
access to scarce resources,” and fails to reduce the concentration of poor
and minority families, all at a time when “worst-case housing needs and
homelessness are increasing significantly.” 176
169

Id.
Id.
171 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
172 Shaun Donovan, supra note 166.
173 Proposed PETRA legislation includes HUD’s revised Preservation, Enhancement, and Transformation of Rental Assistance Act of 2010, 111th Cong. (Discussion Draft, Oct. 21, 2010) [hereinafter
October 2010 PETRA Discussion Draft] (released in October 25, 2010, by Representative Keith Ellison
(D-MN), a member of the House Committee on Financial Services), available at
http://www.nlihc.org/doc/ELLISO_087_xml.pdf; and HUD’s initial draft, Preservation, Enhancement,
and Transformation of Rental Assistance Act of 2010, (Discussion Draft, May 11, 2010), available at
http://www.nlihc.org/doc/PETRA-Billl-Text-2010-05-11.pdf. For HUD’s summary of the PETRA bill,
see What Change Means: Overview of the Preservation, Enhancement, and Transformation of Rental
Assistance Act of 2010, HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/fy2011budget/
signature_initiatives/transforming_rental_assistance/faqs/general_faqs (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
174 October 2010 PETRA Discussion Draft, supra note 173, § 2(a)(1).
175 Id. § 2(a)(2).
176 Id. § 2(a)(3).
170
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PETRA has five purposes, including (1) preservation of “affordable
housing opportunities for the long term”; (2) “enhance[ment of] housing
choice for residents”; (3) “streamlin[ing] and improv[ing] the delivery and
oversight of rental assistance”; (4) creation of more uniform policies “to
increase administrative efficiency at all levels of program operations”; and
(5) “facilitat[ing] adoption of energy-efficient and green technologies . . . to
reduce operating costs, improve residents’ quality of life, and enhance and
protect the value of such housing.”177
The proposed legislation adds subsections (m) and (n) to Section 8 of
the United States Housing Act of 1937. 178 It also modifies existing Section
8(o)(13).179 Section 8(n) covers long-term, property-based assistance contracts (“PB contracts”).180 Amended Section 8(o)(13) covers project-based
voucher rental assistance contracts (“PBV contracts”).181 Section 8(m) provides the basic authority for HUD to establish procedures and provide funding to enable housing authorities and other owners of assisted housing to
convert their existing project-based rental housing assistance contracts,
including annual contribution contracts, into Section 8(n) PB contracts or
Section 8(o)(13) PBV contracts.182
Properties eligible for conversion include project-based Section 8
units, public housing units, rent supplement units, 236 interest subsidy
units, and “other Federal affordable housing programs, as authorized by
statute.”183 PETRA requires HUD to establish uniform policies and procedures for a number of matters, including resident access to housing choice
vouchers, recognition of legitimate tenant organizations, applicant and tenant procedural rights, nondiscrimination and affirmative furthering of fair
housing, administration of the new rental assistance program, uniform
physical condition standards, disposition of properties in foreclosure or
bankruptcy, and HUD’s enforcement of the new rental assistance contracts.184
Residents who have occupied properties being converted would have
access to housing choice vouchers (the “Choice Option”), “to the extent of
available resources,” enabling them to move if they have lived in the property being converted for at least two years.185 PHAs administering tenantbased voucher programs for properties selected for conversion must offer
up to one-third of vouchers available through turnover to families exercis177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

Id. § 2(b).
Id. §§ 3-4.
Id. § 5.
October 2010 PETRA Discussion Draft, supra note 173, § 4.
Id. § 5.
Id. § 3 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(m)(1)(A)).
Id. (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(m)(1)(C)).
Id. (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(m)(1)(B)).
Id. (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(m)(1)(A)(i)).
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ing the Choice Option, and may establish a separate waiting list for the
Choice Option.186
2.

RHRA

RHRA, a revised version of PETRA, was introduced December 1,
2010, as H.R. 6468 by Representative Keith Ellison, (D-MN).187 RHRA
retains the findings and purposes of PETRA,188 as well as the same fundamental organization. 189 By adding two new subsections to Section 8 of the
1937 Housing Act and amending another, it would authorize conversion of
public housing and project-based rental housing assistance contracts 190
through the execution of PB contracts191 or additional PBV contracts. 192 An
additional new subsection spells out in greater detail HUD’s obligation to
“promote informed choice regarding housing opportunities”;193 to protect
tenants’ rights to organize and be represented by tenant organizations; 194
and detailing procedural rights of applicants for, and tenants of, converted
units.195 The NLIHC identified a number of improvements in RHRA, including a requirement that HUD offer and PHAs extend the initial twentyyear rental assistance contract;196 new authorization to provide regional
portability agreements and one-stop area waiting lists;197 new statutory
rights for tenants to organize;198 new procedural rights concerning denials of
admission and “adverse actions involving income determinations, tenant
contributions, unit size, other conditions of continuing eligibility . . . and
eviction or termination of assistance”;199 and new access to building information by “legitimate tenant organizations.” 200 Building information in-

186

October 2010 PETRA Discussion Draft, supra note 173, § 3 (adding 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(m)(1)(A)(ii)).
187 See Rental Housing Revitalization Act of 2010, H.R. 6468, 111th Cong. (2010).
188 Compare id. § 2 (retaining the same findings and purposes section as PETRA), with October
2010 PETRA Discussion Draft, supra note 173, § 2 (findings and purposes section).
189 Compare H.R. 6468 § 1(b) (retaining essentially the same table of contents as PETRA), with
October 2010 PETRA Discussion Draft, supra note 173, § 1(b) (table of contents).
190 H.R. 6468 § 3 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(l), the equivalent of Section 8(m) in PETRA).
191 Id. § 5 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(n)).
192 Id. § 6 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)).
193 Id. § 4 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(m)(1)).
194 Id. (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(m)(2)(A)).
195 Id. (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(m)(2)(B)).
196 H.R. 6468 § 5 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(n)(2)(B)).
197 Id. § 4 (adding 42 U.S.C. § (m)(2)(D)).
198 Id. (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(m)(2)(A)).
199 Id. (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(m)(2)(B)).
200 Id. (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(m)(2)(A)). A tenant organization is “legitimate if it meets regularly, operates democratically, is broadly representative, is independent of the public housing agency,
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cludes the identity of owners, annual operating statements of profit and
loss, subsidy contracts, HUD-conducted management reviews, and information regarding replacement reserves and other escrow funds. 201 One concern NLIHC expressed is the failure of RHRA draft legislation to authorize
new housing choice vouchers sufficient to meet the demand the resident
choice option is anticipated to trigger. 202 Instead, housing agencies would be
limited to their existing pools of vouchers, resulting in applicants remaining
on waiting lists for prolonged periods.203
a.

Replacement of Destroyed or Demolished Public Housing
Units

Advocates for low-income households have long feared that controversies over public housing would lead to a decline in the number of affordable housing units in their communities.204 The so-called one-for-one
replacement rule, which required PHAs to replace any destroyed or demolished public housing units with an equal number of comparable units, 205
enabled public housing residents and advocates to block efforts to remove
units from the public housing inventory. 206 But the rule also frustrated public housing managers who believed it unreasonably restricted their efforts to
replace units that had deteriorated, had been abandoned, or had become
dangerous.207 HUD suspended the rule in 1995 to enable the HOPE VI experiment to proceed, 208 and Congress formally repealed it in 1998. 209 Since
that time, advocates have sought its reinstallation.
owners, management, and their representatives, and has been established” by tenants, voucher holders,
or “a combination of tenant organizations.” Id.
201 H.R. 6468 § 4 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(m)(2)(G)).
202 Ellison Introduces Rental Housing Revitalization Act, MEMO TO MEMBERS (Nat’l Low Income
Hous. Coal., D.C.), Dec. 3, 2010, at 3, available at http://www.nlihc.org/detail/article.cfm?article_
id=7524.
203 Id.
204 Cf., e.g., Michael Abramowitz, Rehabbing the Projects: Chicago High-Rise Plan Rekindles
Debate, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1991, at A1, A6 (discussing how the Chicago Housing Authority’s 1991
plan to refurbish old public high-rise buildings ignited debate over the role of public housing in the city).
205 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b)(3) (1988) (Section 1437p(b)(3) was striken by Act of July 27, 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-19, § 1002, 109 Stat. 194, 235 (1995)).
206 See Jerry J. Salama, The Redevelopment of Distressed Public Housing: Early Results from
HOPE VI Projects in Atlanta, Chicago, and San Antonio, 10 HOUSING POL’ Y DEBATE 95, 96 (1999).
207 Cf. Hope VI in San Francisco, NEWSLETTER/C ALENDAR (S.F. Planning & Urban Research
Ass’n, S.F., Cal.), March 2005, at 9 (explaining how resource-poor local housing authorities declined
reconstruction funds because of their inability to finance construction or maintenance of the same number of units).
208 Act of July 27, 1995 § 1002, 109 Stat. at 235.
209 Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 531, 112 Stat. 2461, 2573 (1998) (amending 42
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RHRA includes a modified replacement rule. A “plan acceptable to the
Secretary for timely replacement of each unit” must be presented whenever
a conversion request includes demolition, disposal, or conversion of public
or assisted housing units.210 Replacement housing must “reflect the number
of bedrooms that are needed to adequately serve returning tenants, households currently on the waiting list and to meet future needs based on other
market data,”211 and it must not result in fewer disability-accessible housing
units.212 Replacement housing may be located as far as twenty-five miles
from the property being converted when “necessary to—(I) comply with
fair housing requirements; (II) deconcentrate poverty; (III) provide appropriate densities for the property being converted; (IV) promote locationefficient communities; or (V) meet other factors as determined by the Secretary.”213 Off-site replacement housing must provide “access to economic
opportunities and public transportation,” must “not be located in areas of
minority concentration . . . or in areas of extreme poverty, except in areas
that qualify as revitalizing neighborhoods, as defined by the Secretary.”214
Though generally supportive of the RHRA provisions, NLIHC announced that it “will seek an improved one-for-one replacement policy for
hard housing units” in lieu of the emphasis the bill places on use of replacement vouchers.215 Representative Maxine Waters (D-Cal.) has continued to press for restoration of the one-for-one replacement policy, as illustrated by her proposed Public Housing Reinvestment and Tenant Protection
Act of 2011, which she introduced in February 2011.216
b.

Rental Assistance Demonstration

Congressional preoccupation with debt and deficit problems, coupled
with Republican control of the House of Representatives, brought legislative action on most domestic issues to a virtual standstill in 2011. Congress
took no action on PETRA or RHRA, leading HUD to recast its basic Trans-

U.S.C. § 1437p(b)(3)) (repeal of one-for-one replacement rule); Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998; Initial Guidance, 64 Fed. Reg. 8192, 8203 (Feb. 18, 1999) (Section 531 “repeals onefor-one replacement requirements”).
210 Rental Housing Revitalization Act of 2010, H.R. 6468, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010) (adding 42
U.S.C. § 1437f(l)(5)(A)).
211 Id. (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(l)(5)(B)).
212 Id. (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(l)(5)(C)).
213 Id. (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(l)(5)(D)).
214 Id. (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(l)(5)(E)).
215 Ellison Introduces Rental Housing Revitalization Act, supra note 202, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
216 See Public Housing Reinvestment and Tenant Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 762, 112th Cong.
§ 102(b)(2) (2011) (listing the purposes of the bill, including to “provide for the one-for-one replacement of public and assisted housing dwelling units that are demolished or disposed of”).
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forming Rental Assistance initiative underlying those legislative proposals.217
HUD included a scaled back Rental Assistance Demonstration
(“RAD”) in its 2012 budget request. 218 It sought $200 million to support
conversion of approximately 255,000 public housing units, 1600 Rent Supplement and Rental Assistance Program units, and 6000 Moderate Rehabilitation units.219 Funds will be used to convert the units to “an improved form
of long-term, project-based Section 8 contracts.”220 HUD estimates that
participation in the conversion process, which would be voluntary, “will
enable PHAs to leverage over $6 billion in private debt and equity capital”
and “to address immediate and long-term capital needs, improve operations,
and implement energy-efficiency improvements.”221 The final FY 2012 bill
authorizes a smaller RAD for a total of sixty thousand public housing and
mod rehab units.222 The proposed legislative language implementing the
demonstration requires HUD to include in the demonstration a variety of
public housing units in PHAs of various sizes and in a “broad range of locations and markets.”223 Residents in at least 90 percent of participating units
must be given the choice to move with continuing Section 8 assistance
“within a reasonable time.”224 Conversion selection criteria and procedures
must include “reasonable requirements for consultation” with affected residents and their resident advisory boards. 225 Converted units must be owned
or controlled by public or nonprofit entities, except that “capable other
entit[ies]” may own or control converted units if no capable public or nonprofit entities are available as a result of “foreclosure, bankruptcy, or termination and transfer of assistance for material violations or substantial default.”226
217

NHC’s Analysis of HUD Budget Proposal for Fiscal Year 2012, NAT’ L HOUSING CONF.,
http://www.nhc.org/media/files/NHC_Budget_Analysis_FY_2012.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
218 Compare HUD, INVESTING IN PEOPLE AND PLACES: FY 2011 BUDGET 16 (2010) [hereinafter
FY 2011 BUDGET SUMMARY], available at http://www.nhc.org/media/files/NHC_Budget_Analysis_
FY_2012.pdf (stating the FY 2011 budget request was approximately $300 million), with HUD, FY
2012 BUDGET SUMMARY 42 (2011) [hereinafter FY 2012 BUDGET SUMMARY], available at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=fy2012budget.pdf (stating the FY 2012 budget
request was $200 million).
219 FY 2012 BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 218, at 43.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 42-43.
222 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012, H.R. 2112, 112th Cong. § 4
(2012). HUD’s FY 2013 budget recommends a $100 million appropriation for RAD. HUD, supra note
24, at B-3.
223 Rental Assistance Demonstration Act § 1(b)(2)(A) (HUD’s Proposed Draft, Aug. 3, 2011),
http://nlihc.org/doc/RAD_Proposal_8-3-11.pdf.
224 Id. § 1(b)(2)(C).
225 Id. § 1(b)(4).
226 Id. § 1(c)(1)(B)(i).
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III. CHOICE NEIGHBORHOODS INITIATIVE
While continuing to seek legislative reform of public and assisted
housing programs, the Obama Administration has implemented an extension of the HOPE VI program called the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative. 227 Rather than focusing exclusively on distressed public housing projects, the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative expands the HOPE VI concept
by applying it to distressed neighborhoods in which public and/or assisted
housing developments are located. 228 The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative
originally was designed to replace HOPE VI, but Congress retained HOPE
VI in HUD’s 2010 appropriation at $200 million and allocated a portion of
that amount ($65 million) to the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative. 229 A
competitive grant program, the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative has two
stages: planning grants (the first seventeen grants, totaling $4 million, were
awarded in March 2011 to cities in fourteen states) 230 and implementation
grants (five cities—Boston, Chicago, New Orleans, San Francisco, and
Seattle—were awarded the first implementation grants totaling $122 million in August 2011).231 While Congress cut the HOPE VI/Choice Neighborhoods appropriations for FY 2011 in half to $100 million, 232 the Obama
Administration requested $250 million for the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative in FY 2012.233
The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative was established to respond to the
limitations faced by HOPE VI residents, which include displacement from
public housing and lack of employment and self-sufficiency gains.234 In
announcing the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, HUD stressed the importance of emphasizing neighborhood transformation rather than focusing
227

See HUD, FY 2010 CHOICE NEIGHBORHOODS PLANNING GRANT AGREEMENT 1, available at
http://portal.hud.gov/huddoc/cn_grant_agreement.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
228 Id. at 3.
229 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 4, 123 Stat 3034, 3080-81
(2009).
230 Press Release, HUD No. 11-032, HUD Awards First Choice Neighborhood Grants (Mar. 18,
2011), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/
2011/HUDNo.11-032.
231 Press Release, HUD No. 11-181, HUD Awards First-Ever Choice Neighborhood Implementation Grants (Aug. 31, 2011), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releasess
_media_advisories/2011/HUDNo.11-181.
232 FY 2011 Choice Neighborhoods Planning Grant NOFA, HUD.G OV, http://portal.hud.gov/
hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/cn/fy11funding (last visited
Mar. 1, 2012). Applications for grants totaling $3.6 million were due August 8, 2011. Id.
233 Public and Indian Housing, Choice Neighborhoods, 2012 Summary Statement and Initiatives,
HUD, at P-1, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=Choice_Neighborhoods_2012.pdf
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012). Choice Neighborhoods was funded at $120 million in FY 2012. HUD’s FY
2013 budget recommends an increase to $150 million. HUD, supra note 24, at B-1.
234 Choice Neighborhoods: History and HOPE, supra note 116, at 3.
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solely on public housing redevelopment. Assisted housing would be included along with public housing, and public funds would be used to leverage
investments from the private sector. 235 Perhaps most importantly, residents
and neighborhood institutions were to be involved “in all phases of planning and implementation.”236
Choice Neighborhoods seeks to respond to HOPE VI’s “inability to
address multi-faceted problems in residents’ lives, such as health issues and
employment.”237 In requesting funding for the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, HUD described three “core goals” for the program:
1. Housing: Transform distressed public and assisted housing into energy efficient, mixedincome housing that is physically and financially viable over the long-term;
2. People: Support positive outcomes for families who live in the target development(s)
and the surrounding neighborhood, particularly outcomes related to residents’ health, safety,
employment, mobility, and education; and
3. Neighborhood: Transform neighborhoods of poverty into viable, mixed-income neighborhoods with access to well-functioning services, high quality public schools and education
programs, high quality early learning programs and services, public assets, public transportation, and improved access to jobs. 238

A.

First Implementation Grants

The five Implementation Grants support complex public-private partnership developments that go well beyond the traditional focus on redeveloping housing. For example, in New Orleans, the Housing Authority is
joining forces with the City of New Orleans, two for-profit real estate development companies, 239 the Recovery School District, the New Orleans
Police Department, the Tulane Community Health Clinic, and several nonprofit agencies engaged in workforce development, community organizing,
and early childhood education to transform the historic Iberville/Treme
neighborhood, which is dominated by the seventy-year-old Iberville Public
Housing project. 240 The $30.5 million Choice Neighborhood grant pales in
comparison to the $1.15 billion in private and public commitments from the
Housing Authority’s partners, but it serves an important leveraging function
for the initial phase of the neighborhood transformative effort.
Under the Iberville/Treme Transformation Plan, twenty-four of the
seventy-four low-rise brick buildings in Iberville will be renovated, and the
235

Press Release, supra note 230.
Choice Neighborhoods: History and HOPE, supra note 116, at 3.
237 Id. at 6.
238 HUD, supra note 227, at 3.
239 HRI Properties (“HRI”), New Orleans, LA and McCormack Baron Salazar, Inc. (“MBS”),
St. Louis, MO. Richard Baron, CEO of MBS, was the lead attorney for the tenants during the St. Louis
public housing rent strike. See discussion supra Part I.A.
240 Choice
Neighborhoods
Project
Summaries
FY
2010/2011,
HUD.GOV
5,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=CNFY2010-2011.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
236
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other fifty will be demolished.241 A total of 913 new and rehabilitated units
will replace the original 821 obsolete and distressed units. 242 304 of the 913
new units will be public housing available to current Iberville residents. 243
The balance will be allocated evenly between low-income housing, tax
credit-eligible, and market-rate units.244 The plan also calls for an additional
1518 rental units to be developed, one-third of which will be public housing
or project-based Section 8 units.245 Fifteen sites have been identified for
homeownership units.246
In addition to housing, “[t]he development team will implement a results-oriented case management model to help adults achieve selfsufficiency, place-based job training and readiness programming and to
help children access targeted education/training and literacy strategy.” 247
“The New Orleans Police Department will collaborate to implement a sustainable violence prevention program that includes . . . organized neighborhood watches, youth mentoring programs and a renter/homeowners association.”248
Other grant cities are pursuing similarly comprehensive and complex
neighborhood transformative efforts. Boston’s Quincy Corridor Transformation Plan, which received $20.5 million, is a $92 million effort to replace
a blighted, scattered, 129-unit, HUD-assisted housing development with
forty-nine new and eighty-nine renovated units.249 Existing vacant and foreclosed properties will be redeveloped to provide new affordable housing,
housing for elderly residents, and workforce housing. 250 The education portion of the plan, emphasizing early learning quality and accessibility, will
be carried out in conjunction with “Boston’s Circle of Promise Initiative, a
comprehensive community integration plan to transform public education.”251 The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative, coordinator of the
comprehensive community effort, has received a Promise Neighborhoods
Planning Grant to help “connect housing and development resources to
education and access to economic opportunity.”252
241

Id.
Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 See id.
246 Choice Neighborhoods Project Summaries FY 2010/2011, supra note 240, at 5.
247 Id. Partners in these activities include the Workforce Investment Authority, the Early Childhood
& Family Learning Foundation’s Outreach Program, the Recovery School District, the Afterschool
Partnership, and the Boys and Girls Club. Id.
248 Id. at 6.
249 Id. at 1-2.
250 Id. at 1.
251 Choice Neighborhoods Project Summaries FY 2010/2011, supra note 240, at 2.
252 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Awards Promise Neighborhoods Planning Grants (Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us242
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MBS and the San Francisco Housing Authority received $30.5 million
as seed money for the $245 million Eastern Bayview/Alice Griffith Comprehensive Transformation Plan targeting the Alice Griffith public housing
development and its surrounding neighborhood in southeastern San Francisco. 253 A total of 1126 units will be developed, including replacements for
all 256 units of the two-story townhouses in Alice Griffith.254 Job readiness,
training, and placement programs will be offered to Alice Griffith residents.255 Health care access will be improved through expansion of the
Southeast Health Center and the development of a senior center and aging
campus.256 Educational programs, including principal leadership, teacher
effectiveness, data-driven instructional improvements, and wrap-around
services provided by family support nonprofits will be added, as well as an
early learning center on the Alice Griffith site. 257
Chicago’s $30.5 million grant is to a partnership formed by the nonprofit development company Preservation of Affordable Housing, Inc., with
the City of Chicago, the Jane Adams Hull House, the University of Chicago, LISC Chicago, and others to redevelop Grove Parc Plaza, a blighted
504-unit, project-based Section 8 development and the surrounding Woodlawn neighborhood on the city’s south side. 258 The University of Chicago
will open its Laboratory High School to neighboring residents and will extend the range of its security operations to the neighborhood. 259 The Chicago Police Department will carry out several major anti-gang initiatives previously shown to succeed in dramatically reducing violence in similar urban
settings.260 Hull House will coordinate social services and provide case
management to residents of both Grove Parc and the surrounding neighborhood.261 An education collaborative, the Woodlawn Children’s Promise
Community, is assisting the Chicago School District and individual school
principals in providing teacher training and accountability programs, ex-

department-education-awards-promise-neighborhoods-planning-grants. The Promise Neighborhoods
program is the Department of Education’s counterpoint to HUD’s Choice Neighborhoods Initiative.
The two programs are designed to complement each other and increase the interdisciplinary scope
of community development programs. See id. See generally Promise Neighborhoods: Purpose, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/promiseneighborhoods/index.html (last visited Mar.
1, 2012).
253 Choice Neighborhoods Project Summaries FY 2010/2011, supra note 240, at 7.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 7-8.
258 Id. at 3.
259 Choice Neighborhoods Project Summaries FY 2010/2011, supra note 240, at 4.
260 Id.
261 Id.
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tending learning environments, and involving parents and family in the
education of their children.262
The Housing Authority of the City of Seattle received $10.27 million
to support a fifteen-year, multi-million dollar plan for the transformation of
the Yesler neighborhood. 263 The Choice Neighborhoods grant will support
the first phase—the demolition of forty public housing units at Yesler Terrace, a 561-unit public housing project, and construction of ninety-seven
replacement units, as well as 141 new market rate and affordable housing
units.264 The overall plan calls for demolition of the entire Yesler Terrace
project and the development of up to six thousand mixed-income units
along with “retail, educational facilities, health clinics, urban agriculture,
parks, new transportation infrastructure and other community amenities in
the neighborhood.”265 Other partners in the Yesler neighborhood plan include the City of Seattle, Seattle University, Seattle Public Schools, Historic Seattle, Neighborcare Health, Neighborhood House, the Workforce Development Council, the Seattle Department of Transportation, and the Perry
Rose Development, a Denver-based company that specializes in green urban infill development.266
Model Cities by Another Name?

B.

At first glance, the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative resembles the
Model Cities program of the 1960s. As part of President Lyndon Johnson’s
War on Poverty, Congress initially created the Model Cities program as a
demonstration of the possibilities of coordinated federal action to revitalize
urban ghettos.267 The Model Cities program ended the traditional practice of
awarding a series of uncoordinated “categorical” grants to cities for various
types of physical development and social services programs.268 Instead, it
provided federal funds to enable recipient cities to prepare local plans for
262

Id.
Id. at 9.
264 Id.
265 Choice Neighborhoods Project Summaries FY 2010/2011, supra note 240, at 9.
266 Press Release, HUD No. 2011-08-31, Seattle Housing Authority Wins $10.27 Million in HUD
Choice Neighborhoods to Begin Transformation of Yesler Terrace (Aug. 31, 2011), available at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/states/washington/news/HUDNo.2011 -08-31.
267 The original legislation was titled the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act
of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-754, 80 Stat. 1255 (1966), but after the urban riots of 1967 and 1968, the program title was changed to Model Cities. John H. Strange, Citizen Participation in Community Action
and Model Cities Programs, 32 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 655, 656 (1972) (explaining that the word, “Demonstration,” was said to have “unsavory connotations in the White House” (first internal quotation marks
omitted)).
268 Otto J. Hetzel & David E. Pinsky, The Model Cities Program, 22 VAND. L. REV. 727, 731
(1969).
263
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targeted areas (“model neighborhood[s]”).269 The recipient cities were
tasked with developing “project proposals, including budget summaries, for
such functional areas as housing, social services, education, health, manpower training and employment, transportation, recreation, and economic
development.”270 A total of 150 cities received one-year planning grants.271
Consistent with the philosophy of the War on Poverty, the Model Cities program required participating cities to include citizens and their representatives in the local planning process. 272 However, Congress gave local
governments, rather than private, nonprofit community action agencies,
ultimate responsibility for local programs. 273 “[P]articipation of the poor (or
neighborhood residents) was to be limited rather than maximized, and governmental and business participation was to be guaranteed.” 274
But cities were new to the idea of citizen participation and its corollary, advocacy planning, a “[t]erm coined by the American planner Paul
Davidoff in 1965, meaning architectural design and planning for powerless,
inarticulate inner-city groups, notably when resisting destructive schemes
by planning authorities, government agencies, or similar bodies.”275 In a
concentrated period during the 1960s, the idea that nonprofessional residents of low income neighborhoods could plan and run local neighborhood development and social services programs manifested itself in several settings: the citizen participation requirement in the federal Community Action Program (“CAP”) of the Kennedy-Johnson War on Poverty
in 1964;276 the advocacy planning movement of 1965; 277 the Model Cities
program of 1966, which incorporated the advocacy planning movement
but in a more limited fashion; 278 the advent of the Community Develop269

Id. at 732-33.
HUD, THE MODEL CITIES PROGRAM 11 (1973).
271 Id. at 7.
272 See id. at 9.
273 John H. Strange, The Impact of Citizen Participation on Public Administration, 32 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 457, 459 (1972).
274 Id.
275 JAMES STEVENS CURL, A D ICTIONARY OF ARCHITECTURE AND LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE 9
(2d ed. 2006).
276 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 202, 78 Stat. 508, 516 (1964) (“The
term ‘community action program’ means a program . . . (3) which is developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups
served; and (4) which is conducted, administered, or coordinated by a public or private nonprofit agency
(other than a political party), or combination thereof.” (emphasis added)), repealed by Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 683(a), 95 Stat. 357, 519 (1981) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2701 (2006)). For a critical assessment of the CAP program, see DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM
FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING: C OMMUNITY ACTION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY 128-64 (1969).
277 CURL, supra note 275, at 9.
278 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3303(a)(2), 3304(b) (1970) (originally enacted as Demonstration Cities and
Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-754, §§ 103-04, 80 Stat. 1255, 1256-57 (1966))
(omitted 1975) (including grants available to programs “of sufficient magnitude . . . to pro270
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ment Corporation in 1967 with the Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation of New York; 279 and the tenant management movement which
originated in the public housing rent strikes of 1969. 280
The early days of the citizen participation and advocacy planning
movements often were chaotic. For example, the author’s first client in private practice was the newly created St. Louis Model City Agency. The city
designated as its Model Neighborhood Area a large swath of the near-north
side containing five neighborhoods: Carr Square Village, MontgomeryHyde Park, Murphy Blair, Pruitt-Igoe, and Yeatman.281 Two of the neighborhoods—Carr Square and Pruitt-Igoe—contained public housing developments, and the other three contained subsidized housing developments. 282
The city was to use the Model Cities funds to prepare a comprehensive plan
for the Model Neighborhood Area.283
This author, along with neighborhood residents, participated in a
week-end charette organized by a young architect 284 to give residents an
opportunity to express their views on what should be the Model City plan
priorities. 285 By Sunday afternoon, the residents and their advisors had prepared a plan addressing the neighborhoods’ child care, employment, health
care, housing, and social-services needs.286 But when local and federal offivide . . . widespread citizen participation” and planning grants “only if . . . the application for such
assistance has been approved by the local governing body of the city”).
279 The Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation was created after residents of the Brooklyn
neighborhood challenged then-senator Robert Kennedy, who was on a walking tour of the neighborhood, “to support their vision of grassroots development.” David Holtzman, The Emergence of the CDC
Network,
144
NHI
ONLINE
(November/December
2005),
SHELTERFORCE
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/144/cdcnetworks.html. Kennedy assisted neighborhood leaders in
organizing the corporation “as a means of reinventing the local economy and renewing hope.” Id. The
corporation celebrated its 40th anniversary in 2007 with an oral history project. Sady, Coming Up in Bed
Stuy, BROOK. H IST. SOC’ Y BLOG (July 29, 2009), http://brooklynhistory.org/blog/2009/07/29/bedfordstuyvesant-restoration/.
280 See supra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
281 Saint Louis Model City Agency, Model City Land Use Plan 3 (1972) (on file at the Missouri
History Museum, St. Louis, Mo.).
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 “The Charette Procedure is a group idea generating and prioritizing tool. Its strength is its
ability to address several issues at once in a highly interactive group setting.” Tips for Charette Procedure, IOWA ST. U. EXTENSION, http://www.extension.iastate.edu/communities/tools/decisions/
charette.html (last updated Mar. 1, 2001).
285 Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Grassroots Consensus Building and Collaborative Planning, 3 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 709, 713 n.18 (2000); see also Strange, supra note 267, at 656 (arguing that participation
by residents of low-income neighborhoods was limited by the fact that “ultimate responsibility for the
development of programs and, more importantly, the expenditure of significantly large amounts of
money, [was] in the hands of local elected officials” and noting that “[p]articipants . . . were also to be
businessmen and public officials, each equally represented”).
286 Cf. Salsich, supra note 285, at 713 n.18 (“Residents participated enthusiastically in the
charette.”).
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cials analyzed the residents’ plan, they determined that the implementation
price tag was well beyond the expected allocation of funds for the St. Louis
program. 287 The plan would have to be cut back severely. The residents
were extremely disappointed, leading this author to question whether unrealistic expectations and insufficient resources would cause the Model Cities
program to founder.288
The Model Cities program was absorbed by the Community Development Block Grant (“CDBG”) in 1974, after only eight years of existence. 289
But the idea of citizen participation endured, although the CDBG citizen
participation requirements “only allow one-way communication of information to the public; any response of approval or disapproval by the community need not impact the final outcome.”290 In the decades since the War
on Poverty and the Model Cities program, citizens and local officials became used to the idea that a forum would be made available for citizens to
communicate ideas about, and respond to, local development initiatives.
The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, while it resembles the Model
Cities program, differs from it in several important ways. It is a competitive
grant program at both the planning and implementation phases. Model Cities was a competitive planning grant program, but implementation funds
had to be cobbled together from categorical grant programs. 291
In the first year of Choice Neighborhoods awards, seventeen successful applicants received planning grants ranging from $167,000 (Jackson,
Tennessee, Housing Authority) to $250,000 (awarded to thirteen of the seventeen grantees), and five other grantees received implementation awards of
$10 (Seattle), $20 (Boston), and $30 million (Chicago, New Orleans, and
San Francisco). 292 While local housing authorities received the bulk of the
planning grants (thirteen of seventeen grantees were local housing authorities), grants also went to the Community Action Project of Tulsa, Inc., Jubilee Baltimore, Inc., Mt. Vernon Manor, Inc., in Philadelphia, and the
Northwest Louisiana Council of Governments. 293 In announcing the grants,
HUD stated that it was “focused on directing resources to address three core

287

Id.
Cf. Id. (finding program design and lack of experience resulted in the Model Cities program
foundering on unrealistic expectations and insufficient resources ).
289 See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, §§ 101, 116(a), 88
Stat. 633, 633-35, 652 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301, 5316 (2006)); Audrey G. McFarlane,
When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of Community Participation in Economic
Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 880 (2000).
290 McFarlane, supra note 289, at 881 n.77.
291 HUD, supra note 270, at 6-7.
292 See Press Release, supra note 231; Press Release, supra note 230; Choice Neighborhood Planning Grantees, HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=choiceawards_
grantees.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
293 Choice Neighborhood Planning Grantees, supra note 292.
288
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goals—housing, people and neighborhoods.”294 The funds are to be used to
build capacity “to undertake a successful neighborhood transformation” and
to “enable [grantees to] create a comprehensive ‘Transformation Plan,’ or
road map, to transforming distressed public and/or assisted housing within a
distressed community.”295 In addition to housing, grantees were said to be
committed to “leveraging investments to create high-quality public schools,
outstanding education and early learning programs, public assets, public
transportation, and improved access to jobs and well-functioning services.”296 The recipients of the first group of Implementation Grants “have
already undertaken the comprehensive local planning process” 297 and have
established partnerships to which they have committed millions of dollars.298
The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative is designed to build on the
strengths—mixed-income, mixed-use development, private investment—
and the weaknesses—displacement and inability to affect surrounding
neighborhoods—of HOPE VI, a program that has been in existence for almost twenty years.299 The Model Cities program, by contrast, was part of
the groundswell of the mid-1960s Great Society. 300 As one of the first serious efforts to coordinate federal urban revitalization programs, it had very
little experience from which to draw ideas and approaches.
As the author’s St. Louis experience suggests, Model Cities in many
ways was starting from scratch. Citizen participation still was a new idea—
the CAP was only two years old and quite controversial. For example, prior
to the author’s brief stint in private practice and his experience with Model
Cities, he worked for the Missouri state agency responsible for implementing the CAP in Missouri. His territory was the five-county “boot heel” of
the state. When he returned to his office in Jefferson City, Missouri, the day
after his first meeting—an organizational meeting of a not-for-profit community action agency that began at 6 o’clock p.m. and lasted until after 2
o’clock a.m.—he was called to the Governor’s office to explain what he
was doing in the boot heel. The Governor, the late Warren Hearnes, a native
of that part of the state, told the author that some of his friends had called
inquiring about the reason for the meeting. They expressed particular con294

Press Release, supra note 230.
Id.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Boston, over $43 million; Chicago, $125 million; New Orleans, $1.15 billion; San Francisco,
$245 million; Seattle, $64 million. Choice Neighborhoods Project Summaries FY 2010/2011, supra note
240, at 1-10.
299 See POPKIN ET AL., supra note 118, at 1; Press Release, supra note 230.
300 See McFarlane, supra note 289, at 871, 874 (stating the 1960s Great Society was also known as
the War on Poverty, and “[t]he urban development component of the War on Poverty was the Model
Cities program”).
295
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cern that state and federal officials had organized the meeting without input
from local public officials. 301
Citizen participation in the 1960s was a new idea. Neighborhood advocates and citizen organizers had little in the way of national advocates
and back-up research support in those days.302 Local public officials were
suspicious of advocacy planners and their citizen clients. They in turn were
suspicious of local public officials.303 Today, citizen participation is an accepted part of federal, state, and local relationships, although sometimes
honored in the breach.304 A host of national advocates and research centers,
such as the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, the
NLIHC, the Enterprise Foundation, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, and others, provide national advocacy and research support for local
planning and citizen participation efforts.305
The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative has the makings of a successful program if it can survive the vicissitudes of Washington political and
legislative life. The HOPE VI/Choice Neighborhoods appropriation for
301 One of the most controversial parts of the CAP program was the organization of not-for-profit
corporations independent of traditional local governments that became recipients of millions of dollars
in Federal “anti-poverty” funds. See generally MOYNIHAN, supra note 276, at 128-66 (detailing the
growth and operations of these not-for-profits and identifying the numerous controversies surrounding
them).
302 Federally funded legal backup centers such as the National Housing Law Project established in
1968, About NHLP, N AT’L HOUSING L. CENTER, http://www.nhlp.org/aboutnhlp (last visited Mar. 1,
2012), were in their infancy or merely on the drawing boards during Model Cities days. See Strange,
supra note 267, at 657-58 (suggesting community organizations did not have adequate support or funding at the start of the Model Cities program).
303 For example, Daniel Moynihan wrote the following about Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago:
Mayor Daley wanted the poor to be employed by the program. He wanted to make the decisions about it. From the point of view of the tradition of working class politics, his position
was impeccable. From the point of view of the middle class liberals who devised and . . . ran
the antipoverty program, it was sinister, evil, hateful.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 276, at 145.
304 Marie Kennedy, Transformative Community Planning: Empowerment Through Community
Development
(1996)
(1996
Planners
Network
Conference,
Working
Paper),
http://www.plannersnetwork.org/publications/combased.htm.
[A]dvocacy planning made great strides in institutionalizing the notion of community participation in planning, at least planning in the public sphere. Today, nearly everyone in the US
takes this for granted and in most publicly supported planning, at least lip service is paid to
citizen participation in the planning process. But, this wasn’t always true, and it was something that had to be won. Although participation can be used in a negative way—as a
smokescreen to obscure real power relations and agendas, the fact that we have a right to that
citizen participation provides an important opening for struggle.
Id.
305 About the Law Center, NAT’ L L. CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY,
http://www.nlchp.org/about_us.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2012); About Us, ENTERPRISE COMMUNITY
PARTNERS, http://www.enterprisecommunity.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (formerly the Enterprise Foundation); About Us, LOC. INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP., http://www.lisc.org/section/aboutus
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012); History, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION,
http://www.nlihc.org/template/page.cfm?id=174 (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
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fiscal year 2011 was cut in half, and a House Appropriations Subcommittee
eliminated the Obama Administration’s $250 million request for Choice
Neighborhoods for FY 2012.306 As of this writing, supporters were attempting to have the request restored. 307
Choice Neighborhoods incorporates insights gained from HOPE VI.
Development teams receiving implementation grants plan to stress
“[i]nteraction and connectivity” throughout the targeted neighborhoods. 308
Collaboration among developers of physical space and providers of neighborhood social services is a hallmark of both planning and implementation
grant recipients, whose interdisciplinary teams anticipate being able to
achieve leverage ratios of approximately 9 to 1 “[b]y tapping a variety of
funding sources both public and private.”309 The Choice Neighborhoods
Initiative is starting slowly, which is both good and bad. It is good because
ideas and approaches can be tailored to unique aspects of target communities and can be tested and evaluated before “going national”; but it is bad
because the need for transformative activity across the country is so great
and the resources to support such activity are so thin at the present time.
The keys to its success are likely to be its ability to garner greater public support while avoiding the urban renewal legacy of displacement and
gentrification which has hurt the HOPE VI program. 310 Can the Choice
Neighborhoods Initiative truly transform distressed communities without
replacing the people who live in them? Planning and implementation grant
recipients will attempt to do just that. For example, Chicago’s 504-unit
Grove Parc Plaza will be demolished and replaced with approximately 510
Section 8 units, 210 on the Grove Parc site and 300 in the neighborhood
surrounding Grove Parc, as well as approximately 460 non-Section 8 units,
some on the Grove Parc site and the rest in the neighborhood. 311 If Chicago
and the other grant recipients succeed, the answer will be yes, and the pro-

306

See supra notes 232-233 and accompanying text.
Press Release, Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal., Congress Poised to Pass HUD Budget that
Could Strand Low Income Families (Nov. 17, 2011), available at http://www.nlihc.org/detail/article.
cfm?article_id=8305&id=48; Press Release, Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal., House T-HUD Appropriations Draft Comes Up Short for Public Housing (Sept. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.nlihc.org/detail/article.cfm?article_id=8127&id=48.
308 Choice Neighborhoods: HUD’s New Urban Remedy Takes Shape, NEW URB. NEWS, Oct.–Nov.
2011, at 1, 14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
309 Id. at 3 (explaining how one project’s “$30.5 million Choice Neighborhoods grant is estimated
to produce total direct investment of $272 million”).
310 See supra notes 127-133 and accompanying text.
311 Press Release, Pres. of Affordable Hous., Inc., First-Ever Choice Neighborhoods Initiative
Grant Awarded to Woodlawn $30.5 Million to POAH Will Yield $270 Million in Investments (Aug. 31,
2011), available at http://www.poah.org/pdf/WoodlawnRibbonCuttingRelease.pdf; Grove Parc—
Woodlawn, PRESERVATION AFFORDABLE HOUSING, http://www.poah.org/portfolio/illinois/illinoisall.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (follow “Grove Parc-Woodlawn”).
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gram will deserve the transformative label. If the answer is no, the Choice
Neighborhoods Initiative is simply Model Cities by another name.
IV. DOES PUBLIC HOUSING HAVE A FUTURE?
Three successive Administrations (two Democratic and one Republican) have sought to move the federal government away from ownership and
management of housing, arguing that the private sector can better handle
development and management responsibilities. 312 Congress has resisted
efforts to give up on the public housing model while acknowledging, with
its legislative authorization of the HOPE VI program,313 that the model as
originally implemented in urban high-rise developments fostered isolation
rather than integration and helped trigger serious declines in the quality of
urban life.
But often lost in the debate about the future of public housing is the
fact that the high-rise ghettos at the center of public housing controversies
represent less than 10 percent of the total public housing units in existence.314 More than 90 percent of the 1.4 million units were providing “an
important rental housing resource” in cities, towns, and villages throughout
the nation when the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public
Housing reported on their status in 1992.315 Since that time, units have aged,
and repair and maintenance concerns naturally have increased. In an age of
extraordinary budget deficits, prudence dictates that efforts be made to find
ways to reduce public expenditures while preserving as much of the public
housing inventory as possible.
Advocates for low-income families are well-advised to closely monitor HUD’s PETRA/RHRA/RAD strategy. Leveraging private investments
to raise funds for badly needed public housing repairs and renovations
makes sense, particularly in the current period of stringent budgets. But the
recent collapse of the private housing market and the resulting foreclosure
crisis raise the specter of a similar calamity were public housing to become
privatized, something that HUD Secretary Shawn Donovan stresses is not
part of the current strategy. 316
Public housing has remained a fixture of American life because a
small but substantial, and growing, segment of society lacks the resources
to compete for housing in the private market. The severity of the current
312

See supra Part II.
See Kleit & Page, supra note 77, at 36-37 (discussing multiple congressional acts in the 1990s
aimed at reforming the HOPE VI program by placing greater obligations on PHAs, while giving them
more discretion over projects).
314 See Salsich, supra note 25, at 462 n.10.
315 See NAT’L C OMM’ N ON SEVERELY D ISTRESSED PUB . HOUS., supra note 28, at 2.
316 See Editorial, supra note 132, at A12 (explaining Secretary Donovan’s commitment to at least
“[t]wo HUD programs” that “bring federal support to projects of high ambition”).
313
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situation is illustrated by the Census Bureau’s 2010 data on income and
poverty showing that 15 percent of the total population (over 46 million
people) had incomes below the poverty line (approximately $22,000 for a
family of four) in 2010. 317 While current housing voucher programs can
offer an effective way for low-income families to obtain housing through
the private market, these voucher programs are woefully underfunded and
have their own ghetto-creating propensities because of the longstanding
reluctance of residents and landlords in more stable neighborhoods to welcome voucher holders.318
A Department of Justice (“DOJ”) lawsuit against the City of Joliet, Illinois, illustrates a fundamental weakness in the voucher programs. The
DOJ sued the City on August 4, 2011, to block an eminent domain action
by the City against the owners of Evergreen Terrace, an eight-building
apartment complex with 356 units subsidized since 1982 through the Section 8 project-based program. 319 The development is located across the Des
Plaines River from the downtown area of the City. 320 Over 95 percent of its
residents are African-American.321 In the late 1980s, the City developed a
revitalization plan for the downtown and riverfront calling for mixedincome housing to replace Evergreen Park.322 Since that time, according to
the complaint, Joliet officials have continued to express “opposition and
hostility” to the development and tried to block restructuring of the twentyyear Section 8 Housing Assistance Payment contract into new thirty-year
affordable housing regulatory and use agreements in return for multimillion-dollar direct loans from HUD to enable substantial rehabilitation of
Evergreen Terrace units under the Mark-to-Market (“M2M”) Program. 323
317 NEERA TANDEN ET AL., CENSUS D ATA UNDERSCORE THE URGENCY OF ENACTING JOB CREATION MEASURES 5 (2011), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/pdf/
census_memo.pdf (discussing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH I NSURANCE
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 14 (2011)). A significant increase in suburban poverty also
was reported. Sabrina Tavernise, Outside Cleveland, Snapshots of Poverty’s Surge in the Suburbs, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, at A1.
318 See Marc Seitles, Comment, The Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in America:
Historical Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 89, 118-19 (1998) (describing “reluctant landlords, who do not want to participate in the
program, and the limited quantity of affordable housing” as two forces that undermine the effectiveness
of Section Eight voucher programs); see supra Part I.B for background on housing vouchers.
319 Complaint at 1, 6, United States v. City of Joliet, No. 1:11-cv-05305 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2011).
320 Id. at 13.
321 Id.
322 CITY OF JOLIET, JOLIET C ITY CENTER DEVELOPMENT PLAN 20 (1990), available at
http://www.cityofjoliet.info/documents/CityCenterDevelopmentPlan1990.pdf; Update from the Field:
At Request of City and Congressman, HUD Sec’y Blocking Preservation Deal, MEMO TO MEMBERS
(Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal., D.C.), Sept. 26, 2003, at 7.
323 Complaint, supra note 319, at 4-12. The M2M Program was established by the Multifamily
Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997 (“MAHRA”), Pub. L. No. 105-65, § 501, 111
Stat. 1384-85, 1395 (1997) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f note (2006)).
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When the M2M refinancing was approved, the City Council passed a resolution declaring the apartment complex “a public nuisance and a blighted
area.”324 Shortly after the refinancing agreement was signed, the City filed
suit to condemn the property.325
The City’s lawsuit prompted a resident of Evergreen Terrace to file a
housing discrimination complaint with HUD alleging that the City’s eminent domain action constituted racial discrimination in violation of the Fair
Housing Act.326 HUD transferred the complaint to the DOJ, which subsequently filed a complaint seeking monetary damages and an injunction
blocking the condemnation proceeding “unless [the City] develops and implements a plan providing for sufficient adequate and affordable housing”
for anyone displaced from Evergreen Terrace. 327
While Evergreen Terrace is a privately owned development, the Joliet
controversy is relevant to the future of public housing. The fact that the
Section 8 subsidy is tied to the particular units making up Evergreen Terrace creates an operational structure that resembles public housing in that
all units are concentrated in one place, rather than scattered throughout the
community as Housing Choice vouchers are designed to be. The DOJ’s
complaint alleges that, rather than continue Evergreen Terrace as a privately owned, federally subsidized development offering affordable housing to
public housing-eligible, low-income families and individuals in a concentrated area, the City consistently has argued that Evergreen Terrace should
be closed down and that Section 8 Housing Choice vouchers, along with a
smattering of public housing units and homeownership opportunities,
should be offered to the 764 residents of Evergreen Terrace’s 356 units. 328
But locating private landlords willing to accept prospective tenants
holding such vouchers has been a consistent problem. For example, in 2003
the Housing Authority of Joliet “sent out over 1,000 letters to Joliet landlords seeking Section 8 rentals for 88 families. After five months, Housing
Authority of Joliet was only able to place half of those families.”329 That
same year, the Illinois Housing Development Authority (“IHDA”), acting
as Evergreen’s Participating Administrative Entity (“PAE”) 330 for the M2M
refinancing program, prepared a Rental Assistance Assessment Plan
(“RAAP”) to assess the impact of transferring Evergreen Terrace residents
324

City of Joliet, Ill., Resolution No. 5655 (Aug. 30, 2005) (recorded with Will Cnty., Ill., Recorder of Deeds, No. R2005-149404).
325 Complaint, supra note 319, at 11.
326 Id. at 12-13.
327 Id. at 15-16.
328 Id. at 9.
329 Id.
330 PAEs are public agencies, nonprofits, and other organizations that have administrative capabilities and demonstrated experience with multifamily restructuring and financing. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f note
(2006). PAEs prepare and implement, under contracts with HUD, mortgage restructuring and rental
assistance sufficiency plans for federally-insured, multi-family housing developments. Id.
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to alternative housing paid for by Section 8 housing vouchers.331 Upon conducting the Evergreen RAAP, the IHDA concluded that displaced Evergreen Terrace families would be unable to find housing sufficiently close to
the City of Joliet. 332 Two years later, a private consulting agency could only
find five landlords with a total of thirty-nine units who were willing to accept tenants holding Section 8 Housing Choice vouchers, despite the fact
that the consultant had ascertained that 790 vacant housing units were located within a fifteen-mile radius of Joliet.333
Public housing offers an alternative that in the vast majority of instances provides decent housing at affordable prices. It is a resource that
should be strengthened, not sacrificed. Secretary Donovan asserts that
PETRA/RHRA/RAD is designed to do just that with its emphasis on the
leveraging possibilities of private sector financing. 334 But the NLIHC and
other housing advocates fear that a loosely drawn bill, as some critics contended the first PETRA draft was,335 could tempt a future presidential administration to use the private financing mechanism as an opening to fully
privatize public housing and open a much larger segment of public housing
residents to the displacement possibilities that plagued some HOPE VI developments. 336
Perhaps the strongest criticism has come from a group of urban policy
academics and researchers who, in written testimony before the House
Committee on Financial Services in May 2011 claim that the Transformative Rental Assistance initiative (i.e., PETRA/RHRA) “is not meant to truly
help poor households and individuals but a means of getting the federal
government out of the low-income affordable housing business.”337 The
signers of the academics’ letter expressed concern over weaknesses they
identified regarding mortgage regulation. 338 They determined the proposal
lacked regulations such as caps on interest rates and prohibitions against
securitization of PHA loans. 339 Furthermore, uncertainties remained over the
331

Complaint, supra note 319, at 5-6.
Id. at 8.
333 Id. at 10.
334 Hearing, supra note 153, at 2-3 (Statement of Shaun Donovan, HUD Sec’y).
335 See Sheila Crowley, PETRA Perspectives: National Low-Income Housing Coalition,
SHELTERFORCE
(Summer
2010),
http://www.shelterforce.org/article/2017/petra_perspectives
_national_low-income_housing_coalition/ (“We are optimistic that PETRA can be improved and that
NLIHC will be able to wholeheartedly endorse it. We are not there yet.”).
336 See Selling Off Public Housing: PETRA and the Neoliberal Agenda—Alarm, Debate and Confusion Over Obama Administration Public Housing Policy, PROGRESSIVE PLAN., Fall 2010, at 8-10,
available at http://www.plannersnetwork.org/publications/2010_fall/petra.html (criticizing the acceptance of risk created by private financing under PETRA and comparing the potential for displacement of public housing residents to the results of HOPE IV).
337 Hearing, supra note 153, at 172 (letter from nineteen urban academic scholars).
338 Id. at 175.
339 Id.
332
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extent of capital needs, the amount of private financing that could be leveraged, and the priorities regarding properties needing significant capital improvement.340 Given that the quality of the property pledged as security is
an important lender consideration, “[t]he properties with the greatest need
are liable to be locked out or to borrow at a reduced volume.” 341
One of the academics’ main concerns is the increasing instability of
the private sector subsidy programs. They note that federally assisted housing programs, particularly the Section 8 project-based certificate program,
have lost twice as many units, 360,000, to “private owners opt-out” as have
been lost to public housing, 165,000, following removal of the one-for-one
replacement rule by Congress in 1998, 342 with another 335,000 projectbased units scheduled for renewal or opt-out in 2010.343 The academics conclude from this comparison that “[w]hile PETRA introduces additional aspects to Section 8, the huge losses indicate the instability and risk to the
long term affordability of privately owned and operated rental assistance.”344
The proposed RAD discussed above345 illustrates that HUD has not
given up on the privatization idea. All three privatization proposals, Reinventing HUD, PHRI, and PETRA/RHRA, reflect an almost naïve belief that
the private housing market will respond effectively to the housing needs of
very-low-income households. But by Congress’ original definition, lowincome families are families “who cannot afford to pay enough to cause
private enterprise . . . to build an adequate supply of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings.”346 As Peter Marcuse and Dennis Keating argue in their
2006 work, The Permanent Housing Crisis, “the bottom rungs of the economic ladder in the United States have always been excluded from the benefits of adequate housing.”347 The original public housing legislation was
carefully crafted to exclude the destitute—the “Okie means you’re scum,”
of The Grapes of Wrath348—in favor of the “worthy poor” who had fallen

340

Id.
Id.
342 Id. at 173. The original one-for-one replacement rule was found in 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b)(3)
(1994), amended by Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 531(a), 112 Stat. 2461, 2570-73
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437p (2006)) (removing any reference to the one-for-one requirement).
343 Hearing, supra note 153, at 173 (letter from nineteen urban academic scholars).
344 Id.
345 See supra Part II.C.2.b.
346 42 U.S.C. § 1402(2) (1958) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (2006)).
347 Peter Marcuse & W. Dennis Keating, The Permanent Housing Crisis: The Failures of Conservatism and the Limitations of Liberalism, in A RIGHT TO H OUSING 139, 157 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds.,
2006).
348 JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 206 (Penguin Books 2006) (1939).
341
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on hard times temporarily as a result of the Great Depression. 349 The private
real estate sector, immediately before and immediately after the Second
World War, wanted nothing to do with people who could not afford its
product and was willing to tolerate governmental involvement in housing so
long as that housing did not compete with private housing development. As
a result, the public housing product was a “no frills” apartment development “on the other side of the tracks,” which in urban America meant isolated and segregated high rise towers. 350
Public dissatisfaction with the public housing product produced the
decades-long proliferation of housing subsidy programs, originally a blend
of supply-side and demand-side approaches, but increasingly tilted toward
the demand side with the emphasis on housing vouchers.351 The acceptance
of the percentage-of-income rental formula, brought about in large part by
the public housing rent strikes, in the Section 8 program created a potentially successful approach to extremely-low- and very-low-income households.
However, the drag on the federal budget of twenty- to forty-year commitments to make up the difference between what tenants were responsible for
and what landlords could charge in the private market became so great that
Congress repealed the Section 8 new construction program after only nine
years.352 While thousands of units were built in those nine years,353 they did
not come close to satisfying the demand.
Three fundamental problems have plagued the demand-side programs:
private landlord reluctance to participate in rental subsidy programs, often
intense local government and neighboring resident opposition to the presence of voucher holders in their neighborhoods, and chronic underfunding
of vouchers leading to unconscionably long, several-year waiting periods
for those on waiting lists. These problems, coupled with the increasing desire of private landowners to leave the project-based certificate program
when their long-term commitments expire, suggest that reliance on the private sector to take up the slack should public housing be privatized would
lead to disappointment.
One often-cited measure of a democracy is how well it responds to the
needs of its citizens.354 In contemporary America, a significant number of
349

FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 109.
See id. at 112-13, 120-23.
351 See Charles J. Orlebeke, The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Policy, 1949 to 1999, 11
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 489, 491 (2000).
352 Act of Nov. 30, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 209, 97 Stat. 1153, 1183 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§
1437f(a), (b)(2)).
353 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS , U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1986, at 724 tbl.1297 (106th ed. 1985).
354 See, e.g., Condoleezza Rice, Sec’y of State, Remarks at Georgetown University: Transformational Diplomacy (Jan. 18, 2006), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm
(defining success in diplomacy as building and supporting “well-governed [democratic] states that will
respond to the needs of their people”).
350
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citizens (more than 44 million), for one reason or another—vestiges of segregation, disability, lack of education, chronic unemployment, ill health—
are not able to compete effectively in the private market for decent housing
that also is affordable. 355 Many of these households will find a way to get
by, but others risk falling by the wayside. For example, in one pilot program to resettle homeless families living in a motel in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the Metropolitan Boston Housing Partnership found that only 19
percent of the families had income from wages, 32 percent had no rental
history, 13 percent had been evicted from their apartments, 17 percent had a
household member with a criminal record, and 10 percent did not have
permanent legal residency (a disqualifying factor for the federal program to
rapidly re-house homeless families, the Homelessness Prevention and ReHousing Program).356
Expecting private landowners to take on all the housing needs of
American society is not realistic, nor is it fair to them. Private landowners
are private for a particular reason—they are free to choose to whom they
wish to make their property available and for what price. Unless they are
nonprofit organizations, they will be guided, at least in part, by the profit
motive. Assuming no dishonesty, unless a prospective tenant or purchaser
can pay their asking price, private owners have no obligation to do business
with people who cannot afford their housing. In the absence of effective
incentives that will persuade private developers and managers to provide
housing for those who cannot afford private market prices, public housing
has a vital future.
CONCLUSION
For over seventy years, public housing has filled a valuable niche in
the housing sector, one that should be preserved. The rent strikes of the
1960s and rise of the tenant management movement are reminders of how
important public housing is to its residents. As Sheila Crowley points out,
“[t]he importance of ‘home’ to the physical and mental health of human
beings cannot be overstated.”357 Cabrini-Green was a mess before it was
torn down, but it was home to Annie Ricks and her children. 358
Public housing certainly has had, and continues to have, serious problems. Much of it is obsolete. A huge backlog of unfunded capital improve355

See JOINT CTR. FOR H OUS. STUDIES OF H ARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’ S
HOUSING 27 (2010) (reporting that over 18 million households containing 44.2 million Americans spent
more than fifty percent of their income for housing in 2008).
356 METRO. B OS. HOUS. P’SHIP, R APID RE -HOUSING OF MOTEL-SHELTERED FAMILIES: MBHP’S
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 2 (2010), available at http://www.mbhp.org/MBHP_HPRP_Report_1110.pdf.
357 Crowley, supra note 127, at 230.
358 Monroe, supra note 1.
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ments exists. Secretary Donovan is right to emphasize the need to complete
the modernization of management techniques begun by his predecessors, 359
but care should be taken to avoid increased micromanagement and excessive administrative burdens in the process. 360
Richard Baron perhaps said it best over forty years ago when reflecting on the St. Louis public housing rent strike:
[R]edevelopment succeeds best when it proceeds in manageable increments and utilizes the
resources of indigenous community groups. Every effort should be made to involve community organizations in the redevelopment process in a meaningful way. The distressed neighborhood is the context of its residents’ social and economic problems and should be used as
the staging area for attacking those problems. . . . Moreover, an objective of any successful
program of long-term stabilization must be to create cohesive communities and to encourage
residents to work together toward a stabilized and revitalized neighborhood. The most effective type of community redevelopment program will be the one which originates with the
residents and derives its vitality from the intelligent use of their talents and leadership. 361

The first implementation grants from the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative
show evidence of the type of inclusive planning Mr. Baron called for in
1978.
Perhaps private sector participation can help resolve the funding problems. But any such participation should be structured in a way that prevents
a repeat of the kind of mortgage-backed securities debacle that devastated
the single-family housing market. PHAs should not be forced into publicprivate partnerships. Participation should be voluntary and only after full
consultation with public housing resident leaders, as well as inclusion of
provisions protecting residents from displacement in the event that PHAs or
entities they created default on repayment obligations.
Public housing is a valuable community asset and should be recognized as such. As the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public
Housing emphasized in its 1992 report, “approximately 94% of [all public
housing] units . . . continue[] to provide an important rental housing resource for many low-income families and others.”362 What has been missing
is full integration of public housing and their occupants into surrounding
359 Regulations issued in 2005 require PHAs owning 250 or more public housing units to establish
a project-based management (“PBM”) system “tailored to the unique needs of each property, given the
resources available to that property.” 24 CFR §§ 990.255, 990.275 (2006).
360 Meena S. Bavan & Shomon R. Shamsuddin, The Transition to Asset Management in Public
Housing, 9 CITYSCAPE 185, 186, 191 (2007), available at http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/
cityscpe/vol9num2/cityscapevol9num2.pdf (describing the shift from a PHA-level of generality to an
individual project-level of generality and expressing concern about the workload, micromanagement
possibility and funding issues).
361 Baron, supra note 39, at 640. The Choice Neighborhoods implementation grants for New Orleans and San Francisco went to public-private partnerships that include Mr. Baron’s firm, McCormack,
Baron Salazar, Inc. See supra notes 239-257 and accompanying text.
362 NAT’ L C OMM’N ON SEVERELY D ISTRESSED PUB . HOUS., supra note 28, at 2. The Commission’s
focus was on approximately 86,000 severely distressed urban, high-rise units. Id.

58

738

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 19:3

neighborhoods. Initiatives such as Choice Neighborhoods appear to have
great potential for accomplishing that goal. But Choice Neighborhoods
grantees must find a way to do so without involuntarily displacing current
residents.

